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Purpose:  The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent to which the 
composition of the board of directors determines directors’ 
remuneration in Swedish listed companies. 
 
Methodology: The method approach is quantitative and deductive since it is 
based on existing theories and previous research. A multiple linear 
regression model analyzes the panel data. 
 
Theoretical perspectives: The theoretical framework consists of previous research on board  
compensation and theories such as agency theory, resource 
dependence theory, and stewardship theory. 
 
Empirical foundation:  The study uses publicly available data from a sample of 43  
  Swedish public companies listed on the Stockholm Stock  
  Exchange, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large Cap, from year 2006 to 
   2013. Data are obtained from Datastream and annual reports. 
 
Conclusions:  The findings of the study suggest that board composition does  
have an impact on the compensation given to the board of 
directors. Female directors and independent directors show a 
positive relationship with board of directors’ compensation. 
Independent directors show a positive relationship with chairman 
compensation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the topic of the study. A brief background is presented, 
followed by a problem discussion and the purpose of the study. In the end of the chapter, 
limitations and target group are presented, together with an outline of the study. 
 
1.1 Background 
Different parts of a company require people with different knowledge and characters. To 
ensure that companies are run and managed as efficiently as possible, a board of directors is 
appointed. The board of directors functions as the highest internal corporate governance 
mechanism (Jensen, 1993). The board holds high authority in the companies and the general 
purpose of the boards of directors is to monitor corporate behavior of the management, advise 
the management, and to further protect the interests of shareholders (Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 
2006). 
 
Corporate governance and boards of directors have been debated during the 2000s and are 
today well-known topics in the business environment. During the past decade, a number of 
corporate scandals have been revealed, both internationally and nationally. At an international 
level, Enron’s bankruptcy in 2001 and WorldCom’s bankruptcy in 2002 received attention. In 
Sweden, ABB and Skandia are two companies that experienced corporate scandals during the 
2000s. Common for the scandals were misbehavior and manipulation of accounting by the 
companies’ board of directors and management (Clarke, 2007; Sevenius, 2007). These 
scandals have led to mistrust against corporate governance systems (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 
2010). Corporate governance is an integrated and complicated system. It is essential with a 
proper governance framework and financial regulations to prevent these kinds of misbehavior 
and scandals. Many European countries have established corporate governance codes to 
enhance the public confidence for the financial market (Söderström et al., 2003). Sweden 
established the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance in 2005 as a result of this. Corporate 
board structure has undergone significant changes in the past decade. In an attempt to prevent 
further scandals and debacles, a majority of the codes require boards to contain a minimum 
number of non-executive directors. Non-executive directors represent an important corporate 
governance mechanism and have a main purpose of neutralizing agency conflicts between 
shareholders and management (Clarke, 2007). It has in Sweden also been discussed how large 
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boards should be and how boards can become more diversified (Söderström et al., 2003). A 
general consensus of the structure of the board of directors and their compensation is yet to be 
determined. 
 
The compensation to boards of directors is a central topic for the public debate around 
corporate governance (Sevenius, 2007). Headlines as “Increasingly remuneration to boards 
of directors”, “Million rain over the board”, and “The board of Volvo can receive a jackpot 
in the middle of the crisis” are examples of controversial articles in the Swedish media. 
Dagens industri (2013) examined the 30 largest listed companies in Sweden, according to 
market value, and discovered that the boards’ fixed compensation has increased 70% over the 
last ten years. The compensation to board of directors should be reasonable and fair, but still 
there are significant differences in compensation levels among large companies in Sweden 
(Dagens industri, 2011). The levels of remuneration among Swedish boards have been 
highlighted in the media to a larger extent than the actual determinants of the compensation 
and reasons for differences in compensation levels.  
 
1.2 Problem discussion 
The work performed by boards is crucial for companies and is basically the core to the 
companies’ operations. As chairman and board member, you represent the owners of the 
company (Clarke, 2007). Boards of directors have equal responsibilities in companies and 
within the boards remain a collective responsibility. This may question the disparity in 
compensation levels. Previous research and media attention show that there is a distinct 
debate on board of directors’ compensation, while the causes of what determines their 
compensation levels are put aside.  
 
There are laws and regulations in Sweden about board structure; for example, boards have to 
consist of a majority of non-executive directors and independent directors. Even though, the 
compositions of a board substantially differ between companies. The size of the board, gender 
distribution, nationality of the directors, and other characteristics of the board are chosen by 
the shareholders of the companies, who elects the board members in Sweden. Different board 
structures may work better for one company than for others. The owners are searching for a 
mix of skills and experiences, as well as other diversity components when electing new board 
members. Boards in Swedish companies are homogeneous in respect of gender, age, 
	   8	  
education, social background, and nationality (SVT, 2015). Smaller boards, more independent 
directors, more female directors, and more international board members have been suggested 
(Söderström et al., 2003). A study made by SVT (2015) shows that only 11 of 90 directors 
have origin from outside Europe in Sweden’s ten largest listed companies, according to 
market value. Diversity is one of the aspects of good corporate governance and diverse boards 
are more likely to generate innovative and creative thinking in the boardroom, allowing for 
better business solutions. Diversity further creates a better stakeholder representation and 
ensures sustainable performance. Diverse boards are crucial in today’s compelling business in 
complex global markets (Smith, Smith, & Verner, 2006; Heidrick & Struggles, 2009). Would 
an enhanced diversity among Swedish boards increase the compensation to the board of 
directors?   
 
Earlier, a specific amount of compensation was designated to the boards of directors as a 
group of individuals, and was then distributed within the board. Nowadays, the compensation 
is determined individually for each director (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2010). 
Depending on the company, directors may receive an annual retainer, committee fees, 
meeting fees, and equity awards. Any compensation differences that exist for a given 
company in a given year typically results from having a chairman position, serving on 
different committees, or differences in meeting attendance. Since the board of directors work 
collectively with their tasks, there may occur problems with distinguishing what every 
individual director accomplish, and it is hard to observe the impact of their day-to-day work. 
It may therefore be a problem with determining the compensation to an individual board 
member. This results in most of the directors in a company receiving the same amount of 
remuneration within a board, and thus is not compensated for the unique characteristics a 
particular director brings to the board. This problem of distinguishing the individual director’s 
day-to-day work may indicate that there are other factors influencing the compensation.  
 
There are several international studies that examine other factors that affect boards’ 
compensation levels. These studies examine, among other things, how ownership structure, 
firm size, and firm performance influence the compensation levels. Some studies are 
examining relationships between board characteristics and board compensation, with results 
indicating that variables regarding the composition of boards influence the boards’ 
remuneration. However, there is no study in Sweden that examines how the composition of 
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the board affects board of directors’ compensation. The composition of boards may be a 
factor that can influence the level of compensation within the Swedish settings as well.  
 
1.3 Research question 
Based on the problem discussion above, the board composition’s impact on board of 
director’s compensation in Swedish listed companies is of interest to examine. This, and the 
lack of previous research concerning boards’ compensations determinants in Sweden, leads us 
to the following research question: 
 
• How does board composition affect board of directors’ compensation in Swedish 
firms? 
 
1.4 Purpose 
There is a growing attention to the relationship between corporate governance and 
compensation. The purpose of this study is to analyze whether there is any relationship 
between the composition of boards and their compensation in Swedish listed companies. In 
the study, hypotheses are formulated and tested after current Swedish conditions. 
 
1.5 Scope and limitations 
The focus of our research is Swedish public companies listed on Stockholm Stock Exchange, 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large Cap, during the period of 2006-2013. The Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance covers the whole period as it was introduced in 2005. The Code gives 
recommendations about corporate governance that limited companies are expected to 
follow. Large Cap companies are the only public listed companies that operate under the 
Code during the entire observation period. There are specific laws addressed to public limited 
companies, which are significant for this study. Relevant laws and regulations are specified in 
detail in chapter 2. 
 
1.6 Target group 
Target group of this study is mainly business students, professors, and people with an interest 
in finance and corporate governance.  
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1.7 Outline 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The introducing chapter presents the background of the subject and conducts a discussion 
about the identified problem, which leads to the purpose of the study. The limitations of the 
study are defined and a target group is specified. The chapter ends with this outline. 
 
Chapter 2 - Regulatory framework 
The second chapter presents Swedish laws and regulations that are of interest for this study. 
The Swedish Companies Act and the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance are presented. 
 
Chapter 3 - Theoretical framework 
This chapter consists of the study’s applied theory. The term corporate governance is defined, 
followed by an introduction of different governance systems. Agency theory, resource 
dependence theory, and stewardship theory are the theories applied in this study and are 
presented in a separate section. Previous research in the subject is presented. Finally, 
hypotheses are formulated.           
                     
Chapter 4 - Methodology 
The methodology chapter outlines the choice of methodological framework and approach. 
The sample selection process is presented and the chapter ends with a critical discussion about 
method and literature. 
 
Chapter 5 - The regression method 
The fifth chapter describes the choice of regression analysis. The five OLS (Ordinary Least 
Squares) assumptions are reviewed and a definition of the variables is outlined. The chapter 
helps understand how the method has been performed and what type of tests that has been 
executed. 
 
Chapter 6 - Empirical findings 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the performed validity tests and the results for the formulated 
hypotheses. 
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Chapter 7 - Analysis 
The results presented in chapter 6, Empirical findings, are in chapter 7 analyzed. The chapter 
reconnects to chapter 3, Theoretical framework. All variables are analyzed and discussed. 
 
Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
The last chapter presents the study’s conclusions and the research question is answered. The 
chapter also contains suggestions on different approaches for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   12	  
2. Regulatory framework  
 
The chapter summarizes the Swedish laws and complementing regulations that affects the 
content of the study. How the composition of the board and the boards’ compensation is 
affected by the Swedish conditions is discussed. 
 
Corporate governance permeates the entire companies’ operations. Corporate governance in 
Sweden is regulated by a combination of laws, regulations, and practices. The framework 
primarily contains of the Swedish Companies Act, the Swedish Annual Accounts Act, and the 
Swedish Code of Corporate Governance. Other rules that apply to a regulated market where 
companies’ shares are traded are also included. The Swedish Companies Act and the Swedish 
Code of Corporate Governance lists a number of features that boards should fulfill in limited 
companies and recommendations about boards’ remuneration and composition.  
 
2.1 Swedish Companies Act 
The Swedish Companies Act is a mandatory law for private and public limited companies. 
The law affects the companies’ governance and has an aim of protecting the companies, the 
owners, and other stakeholders. 
 
According to the Companies Act, limited companies shall have three decision-making bodies; 
the annual general meeting, the board, and the management. These bodies are in a hierarchical 
relationship to each other with the annual general meeting as the highest decision-making 
body. The general meeting is the body in which the owners have the possibility to directly 
exercise their rights to decide in the companies’ affairs (Companies Act 7:1 §). The board of 
directors is elected by the owners at the annual general meeting and the boards’ main tasks are 
to regularly control the companies’ financial situations, be responsible for the organization, 
and manage the companies’ interests (Companies Act 8:4; 8:8 §§). The boards also appoint a 
management that shall manage the current operations in accordance to the boards’ guidelines 
and instructions (Companies Act 8:27; 8:29 §§). These three bodies, which are controlled by 
external auditors, make the Swedish basic system as follows: 
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Table 1. The Swedish model of corporate governance 
Source: Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (2010) 
 
A corporation in Sweden shall have a board with at least one member. If the corporation is 
publicly listed, the board has to consist of at least three members (Companies Act 8:1; 8:46 
§§). The board of directors is appointed for one year at a time (Companies Act 8:13 §). If the 
board has more than one member, a chairman has to be appointed at the annual general 
meeting. The chairman has the overall responsibility of the board and ensures that the board 
fulfills its duties (Companies Act 8:17 §). In public limited companies, CEOs are not allowed 
to be chairman (Companies Act 8:49 §). 
 
A limited company is obligated to have an auditing committee with a minimum of three non-
executive directors (Companies Act 8:49a §). The main responsibilities of the auditing 
committee is to supervise the companies’ financial reporting, supervising the internal control, 
and reviewing and observing the chosen auditor to ensure that the person is impartial to the 
company (Companies Act 8:49b §).  
 
According to the Companies Act, compensation to the board shall be decided at the annual 
general meeting and be determined individually for each board member (Companies Act 
8:23a §). There are no rules regarding compensation levels to boards of directors. 
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2.2 Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 
The Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (hereafter referred to as the Code) was 
introduced in July 2005. The Code applies to all listed companies and is a complement to the 
Companies Act and other existing regulations in Sweden. The Code is a result of a Code 
Group that was formed in 2003 by the Commission on Business Confidence and business 
sector (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2004). The Code was revised in 2008 and 
2010. The changes in 2008 were mainly about including a broader range of companies. 
Before 2008, only companies listed on the A-list (Large Cap) were affected by the Code. 
After 2008, all listed companies were recommended to operate under the Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance. The Code was again revised in 2010, where the focus was on CEO 
compensation, senior executives, boards of directors, and independent directors. The changes 
for compensation to executives were to ensure that the compensation was in line with the 
experiences and knowledge of the executives. Criteria for independent directors were clarified 
in the 2010 version. The criteria concerns statements in the annual reports, annual reports has 
to state whether a director of the board is independent in relation to the company and in 
relation to the main shareholders. 
 
The Code is specifying a norm for good corporate governance and the recommendations are 
designed to provide guidance to companies. The norm is not mandatory, instead, it is based on 
the principle “comply or explain”.  This means that companies can deviate from the Code as 
long as a reason for the divergence is stated. Good corporate governance means that 
companies should be managed as efficient as possible for the shareholders. The purpose of the 
Code is to strengthen the confidence of Swedish listed companies and to improve corporate 
governance (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2010). The Code addresses, among 
other things, boards’ responsibilities, composition, and remuneration. The boards’ 
responsibilities includes appoint and dismiss the companies’ CEOs, to ensure that the 
companies complies with Swedish law, and establish goals and strategies for the companies. 
 
The boards should have a size and composition that ensures its ability to manage the 
companies’ affairs and operations efficient. Boards shall aim to have an equal gender 
distribution, as well as exhibiting diversity and spread in directors’ qualifications, 
experiences, and backgrounds. The boards in Sweden mostly consist of non-executive 
directors. A majority of the directors shall be independent of the company and its 
management and at least two of the directors has to be independent of the companies’ major 
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shareholders. The Code allows for one member of the board to be a member of executive 
management of the company or a subsidiary, this seat is usually occupied by the CEO. The 
Nomination Committee nominates the directors to the annual general meeting. The Code 
recommends boards to constitute remuneration committees, in addition to auditing 
committees. The main responsibilities for the remuneration committees are to prepare the 
decisions made by the board regarding the remuneration and other terms of employment to 
executives of the companies, and follow up and evaluate the applied regulation about 
remuneration to management (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2010).  
 
According to the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (2010), board remuneration is to be 
linked to predetermined and measurable performance criteria. The owners appoint a 
Nominating Committee who gives proposals of compensation for the boards’ work. The 
Nomination Committee presents the proposals at the annual general meeting where the 
owners’ approve or reject it. The annual general meeting also decides the structure of the 
compensation; if the compensation should be fixed, floating, or a combination of the two. 
Compensation to non-executive board members should not include share options and 
executive board members are not compensated for board work in Sweden (Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance, 2010).  
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3. Theoretical framework 
 
The following section presents theories and definitions about corporate governance and 
board of directors. Relevant prior research to our field of work is presented and hypotheses 
are formulated.  
 
3.1 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance can be defined by various approaches: 
 
“The system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992). 
 
“The relationship between various participants in determining the direction and performance 
of corporations” (Monks & Minow, 1995). 
 
“The way power is exercised over corporate entities” (Tricker, 2004). 
 
Corporate governance regulates the direction in which companies operates and aims, and is a 
collective term for describing, formulating, and judging the overarching governance of the 
companies (Blom, Kärreman, & Svensson, 2012). It is a wide area and the main purposes are 
to govern companies so that owners demand for return on invested capital is fulfilled and 
profit generation (Sevenius, 2007). Shareholders, boards of directors, auditors, and 
management all play an important part in corporate governance (Blom, Kärreman, & 
Svensson, 2012). 
 
Today’s concepts of corporate governance were developed in the United States of America in 
the mid-1980s as a reaction to self-serving managers and dissatisfied owners. Corporate 
governance did not receive attention in Europe until the early 1990s, in conjunction with a 
number of company scandals (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2004). Since then, the 
concepts has developed rapidly and today the term corporate governance is widely familiar to 
people active in the business environment (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 2010; Sevenius, 2007). 
As mentioned before, many countries have today implemented corporate governance codes. 
The codes for corporate governance create a base for what good corporate governance is. 
Good corporate governance proposes that companies should be managed as efficiently as 
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possible and contributes to increased dynamics in the economy, stability on the financial 
market, and socio-economic growth (Sevenius, 2007). 
 
An important part of the corporate governance system is the board of directors, whose main 
objective is to represent the owners of the company and to permeate the company’s 
operations. The board performs controlling and monitoring of the management on behalf of 
the shareholders, offers expertise in strategic advices to the management, allocates resources, 
and hires, fires, and evaluates the top management. With their large responsibilities, the board 
of directors is important for a well-functioning company (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kim, 
Nofsinger & Mohr, 2010; Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2010). The board is in many ways 
the interface between owners and company, society and business (Sevenius, 2007). 
 
3.2 Different corporate governance systems 
Systems of corporate governance vary between countries and changes over time. The 
ownership structure, regulatory environment, and capital markets are key components that 
differ in corporate governance systems (Weimer & Pape 1999; Braendle & Noll, 2006). 
Industrialized countries can roughly be divided into two main systems; the market-oriented 
system and the network-oriented system. Weimer and Pape (1999) classify four types of 
corporate governance systems within these two systems; the Anglo-Saxon system (United 
States of America, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia), the Germanic system (Germany, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark), the Latin 
system (France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium), and the Japanese system (Japan). Anglo-Saxon 
countries belong to the market-oriented system while the other countries follow the network-
oriented system.  
 
The Anglo-Saxon system has developed out of market-based economies, such as the U.S. and 
U.K. Anglo-Saxon boards are considered to be of one-tier structure, which are comprised of a 
mixture of executive management and non-executive directors. The system is characterized 
by short-term relationships and strong protection for shareholders. The Anglo-Saxon system 
is also distinguished by dispersed ownership, which has lead to evidence of agency problems 
(Weimer & Pape, 1999). Shareholders’ influence is strongly institutionalized in the countries 
following the Anglo-Saxon system (Weimer & Pape, 1999). In terms of compensation to 
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directors, they are commonly paid in a mixture of cash and company shares in attempt to 
align the interests of the directors with the wide dispersion of shareholders (Clarke, 2007). 
 
Several European countries adapt the Germanic system, which is more relationship oriented 
and has a more long-term view on economic relations than the Anglo-Saxon system. The 
Germanic governance board system is two-tiered, consisting of a management board of 
executive directors that runs the company, and a supervisory board of non-executive directors 
that is responsible for monitoring the managers. The Germanic system is characterized by 
high level of ownership concentration. This usually gives the shareholders more incentives to 
influence decision-making in the company since they own a large part and are exposed to 
more risk than small shareholders. The corporation is considered an economic entity, 
establishing integration of shareholders, employees, management, suppliers, and customers, 
rather than mechanism for creating shareholder value as in the Anglo-Saxon system (Weimer 
& Pape, 1999). Compensation to directors in the Germanic system is usually not based on 
performance to the same extent as in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Clarke, 2007). 
 
The governance system in Sweden originates from the Germanic system, but it has 
characteristics from other systems (Heidrick & Struggles, 2009). The system applied by 
Sweden is often classified as an efficient shareholder controlling system (Gilson, 2006).  
Sweden has a one-tier board structure where executive directors (only one is allowed) sit in 
the non-executive board and employees are reserved positions in the board (Heidrick & 
Struggles, 2009; Randøy & Nielsen, 2002). Regarding compensation, Sweden compensates 
their directors like the Germanic system and the remuneration in general consist of a fixed 
figure (Heidrick & Struggles, 2009). 
 
3.3 Corporate governance theories 
Corporate governance is usually linked to the economic theory that is called agency theory. 
The theory has historically formed the basis for the design of compensation packages to 
executives (Sevenius, 2007). To provide a wide perspective of how board composition can 
affect the boards’ compensation levels, the agency theory, the resource dependence theory, 
and the stewardship theory together with previous research will be discussed. These three 
theories cover the three main functions of the board (Hahn & Lasfer, 2010). The 
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compensation to the boards of directors is treated in the theories and are therefore of 
relevance for this study.  
 
3.3.1 Agency theory 
The agency theory is based on the relationship between agents and principals. The theory 
highlights the agency problems that can arise from the separation of ownership and control. 
The problems can occur in any situation where there is a principal-agent relation; a principal, 
who wants to have an action performed, and an agent, who is expected to act in the principal’s 
interest and perform the action (Fama, 1980). In the basic model, the owners are the principal 
and the management is the agent (Crespí-Cladera & Gispert, 2003). The relationship is 
comparable with a contract between the parties, where the owners permit the management to 
operate the company on their behalf (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 2010; Berk & DeMarzo, 
2014). The extent of the agency problem depends on how closely aligned the interests 
between the principal and the agent are. In an agency perspective, the parties are assumed to 
be rational and will try to maximize their own wealth. This problem results in agency costs 
for the firm and companies has to handle these agency problems to make the organizations 
efficient (Blom, Kärreman, & Svensson, 2012; Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). 
 
In the agency theory, the role of the board is to monitor and control the management on behalf 
of the owners. By effective monitoring and incentives, the board of directors can help reduce 
the agency problems and align the interest of shareholders and management (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kim, Nofsinger & Mohr, 2010). Although, there is no reason 
to presume that boards always will act in the best interest of the owners either, as there is no 
reason to presume that managers will. The relation between the owners and boards can also be 
considered a principal-agent relation. In this relation, the owners are the principal and the 
board is the agent (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). Sufficient incentives in form of performance-
oriented compensation structures are necessary to reduce information asymmetry1, which is 
the main cause of the principal-agent problem. Agency theory has become the theoretical 
framework for research about director compensation, since one of the solutions to the agency 
problem is located in the formulation of incentive instruments. Satisfying compensation 
schemes to the agents is sufficient to reduce agency problems (Crespí-Cladera & Gispert, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  One party has more or better information than the other (Ogden, Jen, & O’Connor, 2003)	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2003). It is important to have incentives for the board that manage effective control and 
encourage the board to do a successful job (Fama, 1980).  
 
3.3.2 Resource dependence theory 
The resource dependence theory is an organization theory, where focus is on the borders 
between the organization and its surrounding (Kärreman, 1999). The theory highlights 
boards’ potential to create relations and serve as resource distributors (Blom, Kärreman, & 
Svensson, 2012; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). This role refers to boards’ ability to bring 
resources to the firm and be an intermediary between the companies and their business 
environment (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), 
the board provides four types of resources to the company; advice and counsel, legitimacy, 
channels for communication information between the company and external organizations, 
and assistance in obtaining resources or commitments from important elements outside the 
company. 
 
Composition of the board is in the resource dependence theory focused on how external and 
independent directors can contribute useful knowledge and networks to companies. The 
directors bring resources to the firms and the more resources boards can contribute with, the 
higher compensation the members of the boards should have (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The 
theory highlights the importance of the board is composed and how each director may bring 
different resources to the board. The level of resource contribution of a board will be a key 
determinant of compensation and a diversified board may result in higher compensation 
(Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003).  
 
3.3.3 Stewardship theory 
The stewardship theory presumes, in contrary to the agency theory’s assumptions of diverging 
interests and self-serving behavior, a natural motivation for individuals to act in the best 
interest of the organizations. Therefore, only limited monitoring and controlling by the boards 
is necessary. Collective behavior has higher utility than those of self-serving nature and 
motivation for managers to act in the shareholders’ interests could appear from the need for 
performing and doing a good job, to be appreciated for the work they do, or to get respect 
from their superiors (Kärreman, 1999). The main points of the stewardship theory consider 
the advisory and strategic role of the board (Hahn & Lasfer, 2010). The theory implies that 
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boards should be composed of mostly of insiders. Insider directors can bring appropriate 
competence and knowledge to the board. Board composition is linked to management 
composition and should reflect the support the management will need (Blom, Kärreman & 
Svensson, 2012).  
 
The governance form in Sweden is based on norms of collective responsibility and voluntary 
compliance. The governance system focus on creating a tight coalition of all represented 
stakeholders and is therefore aligned with the basic assumptions of the stewardship theory 
(Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, & Very, 2006). According to the stewardship theory, compensation 
of directors will not be needed for incentives and motivation because a person will do their 
best independently of the compensation (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Since pay 
is not believed to drive motivation, compensation levels should have a straight level with 
addition only for the individual’s knowledge and experience. 
 
3.4 Compensation 
Board compensation represents an internal and important corporate governance component, 
aimed to provide the boards with the right incentives to act in the best interests of the owners. 
The level of remuneration should contribute to boards of directors doing their utmost with the 
tasks they are assigned, the remuneration should be reasonable relative to the assignment. 
With insufficient incentives, the monitoring and advising functions of the boards are 
jeopardized (Menozzi, Erbetta, Fraquelli, & Vannino, 2014). Compensation of the board can 
be seen as a signal to the external business environment about how the owners’ value the 
work performed by the board. 
 
The boards’ remuneration in Sweden is a pre-determined annual cash amount approved by the 
annual general meeting. The compensation should be decided individually for each director. 
The chairman of the board, who has more responsibility than the other directors of the board, 
usually has higher remuneration (Blom, Kärreman, & Svensson, 2012). The structure of the 
compensation can look different from company to company. The compensation can be said to 
have three parts; fixed remuneration, variable remuneration, and a part that is about prestige 
and reputation. The variable part is usually based on attendance at meetings, however, it is not 
common in Sweden to have a variable portion. It is not common to compensate the boards of 
directors with stocks, options, warrants, or other derivatives in Sweden. All different parts 
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have their benefits and drawbacks in terms of motivation for each director of the board 
(Bryan, Hwang, Klein, & Lilien, 2000).   
 
3.5 Previous research 
Previous research has examined board compensation in relation to different factors. The 
following previous empirical studies are found most relevant for our study: 
 
Crespí-Cladera and Gispert (2003) examine total board compensation on the Spanish market. 
The study is based of 113 large Spanish listed companies during the period 1990-1995. The 
study focuses on the impact of two components of the company governance structure, 
ownership structure and firm leverage, regarding the relationship between pay and 
performance. The authors examine how explanatory variables, such as firm performance, firm 
size, and industry, have an affect on board compensation. Their results suggest a positive 
relationship between board compensation and firm performance, and between board 
compensation and firm size. A negative relationship between board compensation and 
industry performance is find. The governance structure of companies is relevant when 
explaining the compensation-performance relationship and ownership structure explains part 
of this relationship, while firm leverage is not significant in explaining the compensation-
performance relationship. 
 
Ryan and Wiggins (2004) examine the relationship between level and structure of board 
compensation and board independence. The study consists of a sample of 1018 U.S. firms 
during the years 1995-1997. The study examines four different characteristics of board 
independence; board size, board composition, CEO entrenchment, and CEO/chair duality. 
Boards lose independence as the board size, insiders in the board, and CEO’s tenure 
increases. Firms are less likely to increase equity-based incentives, or replace cash with equity 
when the CEO is entrenched or when insiders make up a larger percentage of the board. Firms 
with more outsiders in their boards award directors with a larger percentage of equity-based 
compensation. Their findings show a negative relationship between board size and total board 
compensation, and a positive relationship between board compensation and firm size. The 
independence of the board and the power of the CEO will influence the structure of director 
compensation. 
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Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) examine CEO compensation and board member 
compensation, both separately and the relationship there between, controlling for firm 
characteristics, CEO characteristics, and governance variables. The study considers between 
1163-1441 observations in the U.S. during the time period 1992-2001. Their results indicate 
that total board compensation is positively related to firm characteristics as firm size, 
intangible assets, and firm volatility. Their results further suggest that if the CEO is the 
chairman of the board, board members receive higher compensation. In terms of governance 
variables, busy directors are find to have a significant positive effect on director 
compensation. The results suggest a highly significant positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and board compensation. 
 
Fernandes (2008) analyzes firm performance and board structure in relation to board 
compensation. The sample consists of 51 companies listed on the Portuguese Stock Exchange 
during a time period of three years, from 2002 to 2004. The study includes control variables 
such as accounting performance, firm size, risk, and book-to-market equity ratio for firm 
characteristics, and board size and independent directors for board structure. The only 
significant relationship found is the negative link between risk and average compensation per 
board member. Their conclusion is that more non-executive board members is related to 
higher board compensation, but a company with zero non-executive board members actually 
has better alignment between managers’ and shareholders’ interests. 
 
Barontini and Bozzi (2009) observe the relationship between ownership structure, board 
compensation, and future firm performance within the Italian setting. The authors examine 
215 firms on Milan Stock Exchange over the period 1995-2002. The study focus on four main 
corporate governance characteristics; degree of ownership concentration, wedge between 
voting and cash flow rights, type of ownership, and presence of shareholders’ agreements. 
The results of their study show a positive correlation between two of the characteristics and 
board compensation; the type of ownership and the presence of shareholders’ agreements. 
The wedge and high ownership concentration were negatively correlated with board 
compensation. Firm size has a positive impact on board compensation and future performance 
is negatively related to compensation. 
 
Andreas, Rapp, and Wolff (2010) examine the level and structure of director compensation in 
Germany. The study considers a time period of four years, 2005 to 2008. The study compares 
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directors’ compensation to four types of determinants; firm characteristics, corporate 
performance, ownership structure, and board characteristics. Their results show a significant 
support that director compensation is related to corporate performance, ownership structure, 
and board characteristics. They findings show that compensation to board of directors is 
structured in a way that provides incentives to monitor management, especially in firms with 
otherwise weak governance mechanisms. 
 
Menozzi et al. (2014) investigate the relationship between board compensation and 
governance mechanism on SOEs (state-owned companies) on the Italian market. The authors 
examine the impact board composition, firm characteristics, and firm performance has on 
board compensation. The study analyze the dependent variable, per capita board 
compensation, during the years 1994-2004 and observe 106 Italian publicly companies. Their 
results show that per capita board compensation is negatively related to board size and 
positively related to firm size. Independent directors are find to have a positive impact on 
board compensation, but only in correspondence with high firm performance. The authors 
could not find any significant link between board compensation and firm performance, or 
between board compensation and ownership structure. The authors’ findings conclude that 
board size and firm size appear to be the most important determinants of compensation given 
to board of directors.  
 
3.5.1 Summary of previous research 
All previous research presented below are of relevance for this study. Previous research 
shows the importance of the subject and how different governance and board characteristics 
have an impact on the compensation of board members. None of the previous research is 
within the Swedish settings. The results from previous research gives an indication of how to 
formulate our hypotheses and it is of interest to compare our results with the ones from other 
settings.  
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Author(s) Title / Publishing year
Country / 
Time 
period
Examining Independent variables Result
Crespí-Cladera, R. & 
Gispert, C. 
Total board 
compensation, 
governance and 
performance of Spanish 
listed companies         
2003
Spain      
1990-1995
The impact of two 
components of the 
company 
governance 
structure 
(ownership 
structure and firm 
leverage) 
regarding the 
relationship 
between pay and 
performance
Firm size, Firm 
performance, Firm 
leverage, ROA, 
Shareholder return, 
Ownership structure
Positive relationship: 
Firm performance 
and board 
compensation, Firm 
size and board 
compensation. 
Ownership structure 
can partly describe 
relationship between 
pay and 
performance. 
Ryan, H. E. & Wiggins, R. 
A. 
Who is in whose 
pocket? Director 
compensation, board 
independence, and 
barriers to effective 
monitoring                         
2004
U.S.               
1995-1997
Examines the 
relation between 
director 
compensation and 
board-of-director 
independence
Board size, CEO 
tenure, CEO duality, 
Firm sixe, Investment 
opportunities, Family-
control, Firm 
performance
Shareholders' 
economic interests 
are best served with 
an independent 
board. Negative 
relation between 
board compansation 
and board size. 
Positive relation 
between board 
compensation and 
firm size. 
Brick, I. E., Palmon, O. & 
Wald, J. K. 
CEO compensation, 
director compensation, 
and firm performance: 
Evidence of cronyism?          
2006
U.S.               
1992-2001
Examines the 
relation between 
CEO 
compensation and 
director 
compensation and 
their separate 
relation to firm-, 
CEO- and 
governance 
characteristics
Many Firm-, CEO- and 
Governance variables. 
Examples: ROA, Sales, 
Stock volatility, CEO 
age, CEO gender, CEO 
duality, Board size
Director 
compensation is 
closely related to the 
effect of monitoring  
and value 
maximation. A 
positive relation 
could also be 
identified between 
CEO compensation 
and director 
compensation.  
Fernandes, N. 
EC: Board 
compensation and firm 
performance: The role of 
"independent" board 
members                                         
2008
Portugal           
2002-2004
Examines whether 
the governance 
structure of 
companies 
influences top 
executive pay
Accounting 
performance, Firm size, 
Risk, Book-to-market 
equity, Board size, 
Independent directors
More non-executive 
board members is 
related to higher 
board compensation, 
but a company with 
zero non-executive 
board members 
actually has better 
alignment between 
managers’ and 
shareholders’ 
interests. Negative 
relation between 
board compensation 
and risk. 
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Author(s) Title / Publishing year
Country / 
Time 
period
Examining Independent variables Result
Barontini, R. & Bozzi, S.
Board compensation 
and ownership structure: 
empirical evidence for 
Italian listed companies      
2009
Italy            
1995-2002
Investigates the 
relationships 
between among 
corporate 
ownership, the 
level of board 
compensation and 
firm's future 
performance
Governance 
characteristics as for 
example ownership 
structure, ownership 
type. Firm 
characteristics as ROA, 
Stock market returns, 
Book value of total 
assets 
Positive relation 
between ownership 
type and board 
compensation, the 
presence of 
shareholders' 
agreements and 
board compensation, 
and firm size and 
board compensation. 
Negative relation 
between future 
performance and 
board compensation. 
Andreas, J. M., Rapp, M. 
S. & Wolff, M. 
Determinants of director 
compensation in two-tier 
systems: evidence from 
German panel data                     
2010
Germany        
2005-2008
Examines the level 
and structure of 
director 
compensation in 
Germany, which is 
considered to be a 
prototype of a 
large economy that 
has established a 
two-tier system
Many different 
exogenous variables. 
Ex: Firm size, Leverage, 
Risk, ROA, Ownership 
concentration, Board 
size, Chairman 
independence
They find significant 
support that director 
compensation is 
related to board 
characteristics, 
ownership structure 
and corporate 
performance. The 
results also show that 
director 
compensation is 
structured to give 
incentives to monitor 
management.  
Menozzi, A., Erbetta, F., 
Fraquelli, G. & Vannoni, 
D. 
The determinants of 
board compensation in 
SOEs: an application to 
Italian local public 
utilities                                 
2014
Italy            
1994-2004
Investigates the 
determinants of 
board 
compensation for 
a sample of Italian 
state owned 
enterprices (SOE)
ROA, ROE, Total 
assets, Sales, Board 
size, Independent 
directors
A positive 
relationship was 
found between board 
compensation and 
firm size. Per capita 
board compensation 
is negatively related 
to board size. 
Independent 
directors influences 
board compensation 
in a positive 
direction, although 
only in 
correspondance with 
high firm 
performance. 
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3.5.2 Criticism of previous research 
All previous research has been conducted in other settings where laws and recommendations 
regarding governance can differ from Swedish conditions and policies. In other national 
settings it is allowed for the CEO to be chairman of the board. When the CEO is chairman of 
the board, a conflict could occur when trying to monitor the management. The board may 
then not be able to perform monitoring as efficient as it would if the CEO did not have such a 
significant part of the board. This may make it more difficult to comparing some of the results 
received in different settings where CEO duality is allowed.  
 
Previous studies are conducted in earlier time periods than this study. The results and findings 
from these studies are though still applicable since no more recent studies have been find as 
relevant for this study. It is of interest to include all these studies to be able to compare the 
outcomes from different settings.  
 
Earlier researchers have come up with different results regarding what determines the boards’ 
compensation levels. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) and Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) are 
studies conducted in the U.S. settings, which differs from the settings in Europe. Legalization, 
market settings, ownership structure, and corporate governance are relevant factors that differ 
in the U.S. and Europe. As mentioned earlier, a number of European countries have 
established corporate governance codes, which is another difference between Europe and the 
U.S. The compensation structure looks different in Sweden, and other European settings 
where fixed remuneration is common, compared to the U.S., where performance-based 
incentives are a more common form of compensation (Clarke, 2007). Meeting based 
compensation is often included in compensation measures in previous research, though this is 
not common in Sweden. Different settings and time periods can be explanatory reasons for 
different results in previous studies. These aspects are important to consider when comparing 
previous result with the outcome of this study. 
 
3.6 Board composition and development of hypotheses 
Possible components of board composition that may affect compensation to the boards 
 of directors are presented below. These components are the basis for the study’s hypotheses. 
The formulation of hypotheses are supported by identified factors affecting board 
compensation in previous research, governance theories, and the potential effect a diversified 
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board may have on compensation levels. We include five independent variables regarding 
companies’ board composition; board size, busy directors, female directors, independent 
directors, and international directors. 
 
3.6.1 Board size 
The boards’ ability to control companies is, among other things, affected by the size of the 
boards. Menozzi et al. (2014) find in their study that board size is one of the most important 
elements affecting the compensation of boards. How many directors a board should consist of 
is a well-explored area with main aspect of effectiveness. Research find that smaller boards 
have many benefits relative to larger boards. Smaller boards are according to Jensen (1993), 
Yermack (1996), Ryan and Wiggins (2004), and Menozzi et al (2014), more effective at 
monitoring the management. Smaller boards reduce the risk of free-riding2 since each director 
is forced to increase his/her performance. Larger boards are weaker, less capable of having 
discussions, and less effective at monitoring (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Larger boards 
may also experience negative group dynamics and groupthink3, which can lead to poor 
information sharing and biased thinking (Sheffrin, 2007). That smaller boards are more 
effective and receive higher compensation is consistent with previous research. Ryan and 
Wiggins (2004) and Menozzi et al. (2014) find evidence of a negative relationship between 
compensation and board size, while Fernandes (2008) could not find any significant 
relationship between board compensation and board size. 
 
With the support of theory and previous research, the following hypotheses examines: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a negative relationship between board size and chairman 
compensation 
 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative relationship between board size and average director 
compensation 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Some individuals in a group reduce their contributions (Sheffrin, 2007) 3	  Groupthink appears when the drive for achieving group consensus overrides the realistic 
appraisal of alternative course of action (Sheffrin, 2007)	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3.6.2 Busy directors 
Today, many directors serve on multiple boards at the same time, this is called “busy 
directors” (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 2010). Busy directors is an aspect of the effectiveness of 
the boards and is related to how much time the directors are able to spend on work in the 
boards. Positive aspects with busy directors are that they have a lot of knowledge and 
competence regarding board work and corporate governance (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 
2010). Boards with busy directors will more easily monitor the impact from managers. Due to 
this, busy directors tend to give a signal of being more efficient and successful, which is 
appreciated by the shareholders (Di Pietra, Grambovas, Raonic, & Riccaboni, 2008). Satisfied 
shareholders should be more willing to enhance the compensation given to boards of 
directors. Busy directors will likely be able to bring more resources to the companies from 
earlier experiences than directors that only participate in one board. According to the resource 
dependence theory; compensation of directors is an increasing factor of the amount of 
resources the directors are able to bring to the company.   
 
Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) and Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) find a positive 
relationship between busy directors and the compensation given to the board. With the 
support of theory and previous research, the following hypotheses examines: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relationship between busy directors and chairman 
compensation 
 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a positive relationship between busy directors and average director 
compensation 
 
3.6.3 Female directors 
The percentage of female directors in Swedish boards has increased for the first time in two 
years. Last year, 2014, Swedish listed companies consisted of 25,8% female directors. The 
largest percentage of female directors is find among companies listed as Large Cap, the 
proportion of female directors is 30,1% in these companies (Ekelund, 2015). To reach more 
gender equal boards, the Swedish Corporate Governance Board has established guidelines and 
goals for the future. The proportion of female directors shall reach 35% by the year 2017, and 
40% by 2020 (Swedish Corporate Governance Board, 2014). 
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In recent years, compensation differences between genders have been controversial. Research 
has shown that women receive generally lower salaries than men (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001; 
Elkinawy & Stater, 2011). In Sweden, during 2013, there was a remuneration difference of 
13.4% between men and women (Medlingsinstitutet, 2013). In a study performed by Allbright 
(2013), it follows that women receive, on average, lower remuneration also for their board 
work compared to men in Sweden. According to the study, an explanation of this is that 
women are rarely elected into the boards representing the largest companies, where the 
remuneration is subsequent higher. Another factor that influences the remuneration of boards 
of directors is the type of industries in which the companies operates. Female directors tend to 
be part of boards representing companies in industries with lower compensation levels 
(Allbright, 2013). Smith, Smith, and Verner (2006) find that female directors on boards have 
a negative impact on firm performance. Crespí-Cladera and Gispert (2003) state that lower 
firm performance will result in lower compensation of directors. It is therefore reasonable to 
presume that more female directors will result in lower compensation levels. The study 
(Smith, Smith, & Verner, 2006) is conducted within the Danish settings, which is not too far 
away from the Swedish settings. Even though a diversified board can contribute with more 
resources and perspectives, which would result in higher compensation, this is not consistent 
from previous research. The results conducted from previous studies are contrary to the 
Stewardship theory, where the compensation should be determined by the amount of work, 
effort, and knowledge, and not by the gender of the board member. 
 
Since few studies have examined female directors’ influence on board compensation, the 
following hypotheses are based on the arguments that women have lower wages and that 
female directors have a negative impact on firm performance: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a negative relationship between female directors and chairman 
compensation 
 
Hypothesis 3b: There is a negative relationship between female directors and average 
director compensation 
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3.6.4 Independent directors 
Independent directors have become an integral part of boards in order to counteract inherent 
agency conflicts and align the interests of managers and shareholders. Independent directors 
are outside directors who are not currently employees of the company (also called non-
executive directors) and are not involved in any economic relationships with the compay, its 
executive directors, or its shareholders (Menozzi et al., 2014). Outside directors are often 
taken for being independent directors, yet not all outside directors qualify for independence 
(Menozzi et al., 2014; Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010). 
 
According to the agency theory, a board of directors should consist of a majority of 
independent directors since they provide a more effective surveillance of the management 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Independent directors are valuable to the board and are supposed to 
have more external information, be less biased, and thus more effective monitors than non-
independent directors. Independent directors also result in more effective corporate 
governance (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010; Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 2010; Ryan & 
Wiggins, 2004). Independent directors usually serves on other boards as professionals, 
therefore they often have a lot of experience and are afraid of losing that reputation if they are 
not performing well (Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010). 
 
There have been different results regarding the relationship between independent directors 
and compensation to boards of directors. Andreas, Rapp, and Wolff (2010) find that total 
compensation per director increases with more independent directors on the board. Ryan and 
Wiggins (2004) found that outsider-dominated boards receive a larger amount of cash 
compensation than boards with a minority of outside directors. Fernandes (2008) and 
Menozzi et al. (2014) did not identify any significant relationship between independent 
directors in the board and total board compensation. With the support of theory and previous 
research, the following hypotheses examines: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: There is a positive relationship between independent directors and chairman 
compensation 
 
Hypothesis 4b: There is a positive relationship between independent directors and average 
director compensation 
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3.6.5 International directors 
International directors are a well-discussed subject but few studies have been done on 
international board of directors’ influence over the boards’ compensation. 
 
Differing levels of executive compensation across countries are huge. For example, 
executives in the U.S. have significantly higher compensation than equivalent executives in 
many European countries (Elston & Goldberg, 2003; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2005). Heidrick 
and Struggles (2009) examine board compensation in the European settings and find that 
Sweden is one of the countries that offer the lowest compensation to boards of directors. This 
can lead to that directors from other countries, where the compensation levels are higher, will 
require higher compensation for board work than a Swedish board member. 
 
A board with international members will have different experiences and cultural backgrounds 
and may bring different approaches and perspectives to the company (Sjöstrand & Petrelius, 
2002). The international directors bring useful networks from the international market and 
remove barriers to trade and capital flows. The companies will symbolize an international 
profile on the market (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) examine the 
effect of foreign (Anglo-American) board membership on firm performance in Norway and 
Sweden. The study indicates a higher firm value for firms that have Anglo-American board 
members. Randøy and Nielsen (2002) find a positive relationship between foreign board 
membership and CEO compensation, which means that foreign board membership, has 
influence on corporate governance outcomes. This study expects that international directors 
have a positive effect on board compensation since it increases the diversity within the board. 
 
Hypothesis 5a: There is a positive relationship between international directors and chairman 
compensation 
 
Hypothesis 5b: There is a positive relationship between international directors and average 
director compensation 
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3.7 Summary of hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses   
Supporting 
theory Supporting research 
Hypothesis 1 
a: Larger boards decrease the 
compensation to the chairman Agency theory  Ryan & Wiggins, 2004 
  
b: Larger boards decrease the 
compensation to a director   Menozzi et al., 2004 
Hypothesis 2 
a: A higher proportion of busy directors 
increase the compensation to the chairman 
Resource dependence 
theory Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2006 
  
b: A higher proportion of busy directors 
increase the compensation to a director     
Hypothesis 3 
a: A higher proportion of female directors 
decrease the compensation to the chairman   Allbright, 2013 
  
b: A higher proportion of female directors 
decrease the compensation to a director   Elkinawy & Stater, 2011 
Hypothesis 4 
a: A higher proportion of independent 
directors increase the compensation to the 
chairman 
Agency theory / 
Resource dependence 
theory 
Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 
2010 
  
b: A higher proportion of independent 
directors increase the compensation to a 
director 
  Ryan & Wiggins, 2004 
Hypothesis 5 
a: A higher proportion of international 
directors increase the compensation to the 
chairman 
Resource dependence 
theory Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003 
  
b: A higher proportion of international 
directors increase the compensation to a 
director 
  Randøy & Nielsen, 2002 
Table 3. Summary of the study’s hypotheses 
 
3.8 Control variables  
Compensation of boards may depend on other factors than those tested in the hypotheses. 
Therefore, a number of control variables will be included in the regressions. The control 
variables are expected to have a significant impact on the boards’ compensation. The 
variables are used as control variables since these are not board-specific. Control variables are 
included to improve the analysis of the relationship between board composition and board 
compensation and to reduce the risk of inconsistent conclusions. The following control 
variables are applied: 
 
Firm size 
The majority of prior literature indicates that firm size is an important variable explaining 
board compensation. The complexity of the job, the skills required, the number of hierarchical 
structures, and the ability to pay, all indicate that larger firms are paying their directors more. 
Firm size in relation to compensation to directors overall is a well-explored area with clear 
results that shows that compensation will be higher if the company is larger. Crespí-Cladera 
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and Gispert (2003), Ryan and Wiggins (2004), and Menozzi et al. (2014) find that board 
remuneration is positively correlated with the size of the company. In line with previous 
research, a control for this variable occurs. 
 
Firm performance 
Compensation to executives should, according to the agency theory, be linked to firm 
performance and should work as an incentive to align the interests of directors and 
shareholders. There are evidences of both positive and negative relationships between board 
compensation and firm performance (Menozzi et al., 2014). Crespí-Cladera and Gispert 
(2003) find a positive relation between board remuneration and firm performance. In line with 
previous research, a control for this variable occurs. 
 
Firm leverage 
Debt may substitute as a monitoring device or increased debt may indicate that the company 
may require more monitoring because its equity is eroding. Crespí-Cladera and Gispert (2003) 
test the impact of firm leverage on board remuneration but could not confirm that leverage 
plays a significant role in establishing board remuneration policies. Brick, Palmon, and Wald 
(2006) on the other hand find that director compensation is positively related to leverage. 
Control for leverages’ impact on board compensation is of interest. 
 
Ownership concentration 
The level of ownership concentration is expected to impact the agency costs of the company 
(Barontini & Bozzi, 2009). Sweden is a country with historically strong ownership 
commitment and has high ownership concentration (Sevenius, 2007). Sweden has many well-
known ownership spheres, such as Wallenberg and Bonnier. Barontini and Bozzi (2009) 
associate high ownership concentration with lower board pay and find a negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and board compensation. To control for the impact of 
ownership concentration on board compensation is therefore of interest. 
 
CEO on the board 
Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) find that compensation to the board is affected by whether or 
not the CEO is on the board. If the CEO is on the board, compensation to the board will be 
higher. When the CEO is one of the directors, the board will lose part of its independence and 
the control of the management will decrease.  
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4. Methodology  
 
This chapter presents the methodological framework and approach used in this study. The 
chapter describes the selection procedure, data sample, and exclusions. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion and evaluation of the selected method and sources. 
 
4.1 Methodological approach 
The methodological approach in this study is of deductive character since the study is based 
on previous research and theories. A deductive approach is when literature, studies, and what 
is known from previous examinations, becomes hypotheses, which in turn affects the process 
of collecting data. The empirical results and analysis of the sample lead to either acceptance 
or rejection of the hypotheses. After this, consequences of the results tie together and 
compares to earlier research. The process can be summarized in six steps: 
 
1) Theory → 2) Hypotheses → 3) Data collection → 4) Results → 5) Hypotheses are 
accepted or rejected → 6) Reformulation of the theory (Bryman & Bell, 2013). 
 
Since we study the possible effects the composition of the board have on the board of 
directors’ compensation, a quantitative method is preferred instead of a qualitative method. A 
quantitative method is used when analyzing a large sample of observations in form of 
hypotheses, and when the study focuses on specific factors as measurement and 
generalization (Bryman & Bell, 2013). The research question is analyzed by historical 
information. The data and the sample method are formulated by earlier theory and research. 
The quantitative method has in earlier research been the most frequently used and makes it 
possible for us to perform the needed statistical tests and regressions. 
 
The ontological approach of the study is objectivism, meaning that the research relates to the 
social reality as an external and objective reality. We meet social phenomenon in form of 
external facts we cannot control (Bryman & Bell, 2013). 
 
4.2 Data sample 
The data sample consists of all companies traded on Stockholm Stock Exchange’s (Nasdaq 
OMX Stockholm) list of Large Cap over a time period of eight years, from 2006 to 2013. 
	   36	  
After exclusions, 43 companies remains in the sample. We selected to start with the year 2006 
since the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance was introduced in the middle of 2005, and 
to end year 2013 since it is the last year with available annual reports of the companies. This 
gives us a total sample of 344 observations. Companies listed as Large Cap are of interest to 
observe since these companies act in accordance with the Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance during the whole time period. The Code did not cover Small and Mid Cap until 
after 2008. This can have effects on the results, thereby, those lists are not included in this 
study. The chosen time period comprises the financial crisis, which began in 2008. The 
financial crisis may affect the compensation levels, which can have an impact on the result of 
this study. The sample of an observation period over eight years and across companies within 
various industries increases the probability of a relevant outcome.   
 
4.2.1 Exclusions  
All financial and utilities companies are excluded from the sample due to differences in 
accounting principles. Companies not present on the list of Large Cap the entire analyzed 
time period are excluded; Africa Oil, EnQuestPLC, and HEXPOL were listed as Large Cap 
after 2006. This can lead to potential survivor bias; however, removing only these three 
companies will not have any significant effect on the result of this study. Tieto Oyj is 
excluded from our study because of the difference in the compensation structure compared to 
the other companies in the sample. Keeping Tieto Oyj in the sample can lead to misleading 
results.  
 
4.3 Data sample method 
The study has been conducted by collecting data and information from the companies’ annual 
reports for the observed years and from the database Datastream. The study covers only 
public information. 
 
4.3.1 Selection procedure 
The data collection begins with controlling for which companies have been registered on 
Large Cap during our selected time period. The collection of data is based on a comparative 
design, which simplifies the comparison between the results from this study and previous 
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research. To apply a comparative design, the information is collected and analyzed in the 
same way for all companies in the study (Bryman & Bell, 2013). 
 
The variables are chosen based on findings in previous research and theories. Information 
about our independent variables; board size, busy directors, female directors, independent 
directors, and international directors are find in the companies’ annual reports. Two of the 
control variables, CEO on the board and ownership concentration, are collected from annual 
reports as well. Firm size, firm performance, and firm leverage are gathered from the database 
Datastream. In cases where companies report remuneration in another currency than Swedish 
crowns, the amount is recalculated to Swedish crowns by the average annual exchange rate. 
Exchange rates are retrieved from the website of the Central Bank of Sweden. 
 
When all data has been collected and organized, the necessary tests are performed. First, 
descriptive statistics are outlined to get an overview of the selected sample and then validity 
tests are conducted. A more detailed review of the results is presented in Chapter 6, Empirical 
findings. The impact of the independent variables on the chosen dependent variables is also 
presented in Chapter 6. A analyze of the results received is to be find in Chapter 7, 
Analysis.      
 
4.3.2 Secondary data 
The data of the study is classified as secondary since it is collected from annual reports and 
other already published information. To retrieve data about the chosen dependent and 
independent variables, the companies’ annual reports are considered the most appropriate 
approach since there are no available databases for these components. Most of the data can be 
found in the corporate governance report in the annual report. It is stated in the Annual 
Accounts Act (1995:1554) that limited companies have to report information about the board 
of directors and their compensation.  
 
Benefits of using secondary data from annual reports are that the data is of high quality with 
only a small risk for loss of data due to inaccessible data. Secondary data is more time 
efficient and less costly compared to primary data where the data is created by the researcher. 
The reliability of the information from secondary data is important to consider since someone 
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else has produced the information (Bryman & Bell, 2013). The secondary data in our study 
perceives reliable since an authorized auditor before publishing has revised the annual reports.  
 
4.3.3 Literature 
An extensive literature review has been conducted to gain a broad knowledge of previous 
research, which has facilitated the formulation of our hypotheses. The literatures mostly used 
are scientific articles, theory books, and Swedish legislation. Academic journals are collected 
online from Google Scholar and a database provided by Lund University, LUBsearch. Typical 
words searched for are: board compensation, board remuneration, board of directors, 
corporate governance, board structure, and board composition.    
 
4.4 Source criticism  
A detailed review of criticism of the literature and methods practiced to conduct the study are 
described below.  
 
4.4.1 Literary criticism 
The scientific articles used in the study are usually oriented in the business, management, and 
economic environment. The articles have been inspected before publishing and the sources 
are counted as solid. The fact that the authors can be biased is important to have in mind when 
reviewing these articles. We also understand the impossibility of covering all previous 
research, articles, and other type of literature, which may cause bias of the observed material, 
but with the time frame and availability, this is unavoidable. Some of the independent 
variables have been studied more than others in earlier research, which makes the information 
about the effect on board compensation more limited for some of our variables. 
 
With help from academic business journals and a wide spectrum of books about corporate 
governance, and especially with a focus on board of directors and their compensation, a 
careful examination of valid literature has been conducted. A sample of literature from 
different decades has been examined to receive a broad picture of the explored area (Bryman 
& Bell, 2013). 
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4.4.2 Method criticism 
The method is selected for the outcome to be as trustworthy as possible. Future studies should 
receive the same results when applying the same method. Criticism on the quantitative 
method is mainly based on the precision and correctness of the data used. Since an authorized 
auditor before publishing reviews the annual reports, the information is assumed to be 
reliable. The majority of the selected variables are examined in previous research, which 
indicate that valid results can be found when testing the formulated hypotheses. This makes a 
comparison between the results from this study and previous studies feasible. 
 
To be able to perform the tests, a panel data set is used. This is applied since the study 
observes variables both cross-sectional and over time. One benefit with panel data is the 
possibility to detect variation both between the firms and between the years examined. This 
makes the results easier to explain and analyze. 
   
4.5 Reliability, validity, and replicability 
For a study to be credible, there are three key criteria that have to be fulfilled; reliability, 
validity, and replicability.  
 
4.5.1 Reliability 
Reliability aims to the degree of reliability in the study. The reliability increases if the study is 
conducted in a way that evokes trust. The aim is to be sure that the same results and 
conclusions had been reached if the same study had been made by someone else (Bryman & 
Bell, 2013). To increase the reliability, the study has been conducted impartially and the used 
material has been examined carefully and with criticism. Exclusions in our sample have been 
done only when we have find reasons to do so, this ensures that we will not lose reliability. 
Reliable sources, in form of annual reports that have been reviewed by authorized auditors, 
are used when collecting information and performing the tests. Although, it is important to be 
aware that there may be manipulation in the annual reports that are beneficial for the 
companies. The reliability can also be affected by the possibility that the companies can 
report data in different ways from one year to another, which can complicate the collection of 
data. 
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Regarding the above reasoning, the results are assumed to be the same if the study would be 
done again by someone else, which is a criterion that should be met in order for the study to 
be said having good reliability (Bryman & Bell, 2013). 
 
4.5.2 Validity 
A study should meet the criteria for validity to be considered to have high validity and 
relevance. The concept of validity refers to the measurement of the required data and involves 
an estimation of the study’s findings and whether these are related or not. Validity can be 
divided into internal and external validity (Bryman & Bell, 2013). 
 
Internal validity aims to ensure that the study measures what it is intended to measure. To 
fulfill the criteria for internal validity in this study, the variation in the independent variables 
should explain the variation in the dependent variable (Bryman & Bell, 2013). It is important 
to include variables that have large impact on the compensation to the boards. To reach high 
validity, control variables have been included in the study. These variables have shown an 
effect on board of directors’ compensation in previous studies. Previous studies’ variables and 
approaches have been examined and are used as a base for the method of this study and 
regression analysis, which also increases the validity of the study. 
 
External validity refers to how well the results are valid and generalizable in other contexts. 
Since this study only covers companies listed on Stockholm Stock Exchange’s Large Cap list, 
the results cannot be fully generalized to other companies. However, Large Cap companies 
and other publicly listed companies in Sweden operate under the same regulations which 
make our results generalizable to some extent on those companies as well. 
 
4.5.3 Replicability 
Replicability is described as a crucial factor when performing quantitative research. The 
methodology has to be well specified so that other researchers will be able to conduct the 
study and receive the same results (Bryman & Bell, 2013). Therefore, type of method, 
selection of data, and other approaches are presented in the study in a way that is easy to 
follow with no uncertainty.  
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5. The regression model 
 
The chapter presents basic information about the regression method, chosen data structure, 
and validation tests. The study’s regression model and its variables are presented. 
 
5.1 Regression analysis 
Multiple linear regression analysis is an appropriate approach since the study wants to find 
connections between different phenomena and variables. A multiple regression analyzes the 
relationship between a given variable (the dependent variable) and a set of other variables (the 
independent variables). The relationship is a way to explain movements in a variable by 
reference to movements in one or more other variables. Since the study involves more than 
one independent variable and wants to test how the dependent variable depends on several 
different independent variables at the same time, a multiple regression is used, instead of a 
simple regression (Brooks, 2008). Two multiple regressions will be run in order to 
empirically examine the research question of this study. Each regression includes a dependent 
variable, chairman compensation or average director compensation, and in each case includes 
the independent variables presented in section 3.7. 
 
The data in the sample represents observations collected both cross-sectional and over time, 
where the cross-section refers to the width of the data (43 firms), while the time series data 
refers to the time period of the sample (between 2006 and 2013). A panel data regression is 
preferred as it allows to combine both data types and analyze the variations from a cross-
sectional and time dimension (Bryman & Bell, 2013). The panel data analysis is then based 
on the data in the sample over the whole analyzed time period. Data with variation both cross-
sectional and over time is more informative and generalizable than cross-sectional data 
collected at a single point in time, or time-series data for a single entity. Other benefits with 
panel data is that more complex problems can be managed, it helps mitigating the problem of 
multicollinearity, and results in a greater degree of explanation through increased degrees of 
freedom in the regression. Weakness with panel data is that it limits the analysis since it 
cannot be analyzed in the same way as if the data consist of pure cross-sectional data or time-
series data (Brooks, 2008).  However, benefits of using panel data weigh the disadvantages in 
our case. Our choice of a multiple panel data regression analysis is supported by the fact that 
it is a commonly used approach in financial research. It is a proven method that has been used 
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in previous studies, Crespí-Cladera and Gispert (2003), Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006), 
Fernandes (2008), Barontini and Bozzi (2009), and Andreas, Rapp, and Wolff (2010), to 
analyze boards’ compensation, which further supports our choice of regression model. 
 
The regressions will be run through the econometrics software program EViews 8. 
 
Regression formula: 𝒀𝒊𝒕 =   𝛼 +   𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝛽!𝑥!" +                              𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝛽!"𝑥!" + 𝜀!" 
 
5.1.1 Panel data analysis 
The most straightforward way to use panel data is by estimating a pooled regression, in which 
only one regression is stimulated on all the data together. The equation is estimated with an 
OLS method and estimating a pooled regression does not require a lot of parameters (Brooks, 
2008). Despite the simplicity of this type of regression, it has its limitations. A pooled 
regression assumes the average values of the variables to have a constant relationship to each 
other, and to be constant cross-sectional or over time (Brooks, 2008). The use of pooled 
regression on panel data is not recommended because it will miss out the benefits with panel 
data. Since the relationship between the variables in our study will most likely not remain 
constant it will be difficult to apply this type of approach. 
 
According to Brooks (2008), there are two other recommended approaches to panel data; 
“fixed effects” models and “random effects” models. The two models are presented below: 
 
5.1.1.1 Fixed effects model 
When performing fixed effects model, variation is found in either the cross-section data or the 
time-series data. This indicates that the intercept differs and is varying cross-sectional or over 
time, while the other remains constant. A fixed effect model is conducted to control for 
residual values that may otherwise distort the values and dummy variables are created to be 
able to differ between time and cross-section units. The null hypothesis of fixed effect is that 
the intercept of the dummy variables has the same parameter. If the null hypothesis is 
rejected, the assumption about the same intercept cannot be used. If the values of cross-
section/Period F and Chi-square in the model are significant, the null hypothesis is rejected 
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and fixed effect is an appropriate model. If they are not significant, the dummy variables are 
excluded from the regression and the assumption of having the same parameter for all dummy 
variables is true and OLS can be used (Brooks, 2008).  
     
5.1.1.2 Random effects model 
Random effects model is an alternative to the fixed effects model. The model is similar to the 
fixed effects model in some ways. There is a variation in the intercept terms of each cross-
section unit, but constant over time. The model differs from fixed effects by the assumptions 
of the intercepts for the cross-sections units are arising from a common intercept, plus a 
random variable. The random variable, 𝜀, measures the random deviation of each cross-
section units intercept term from the “global” intercept term, α (Brooks, 2008). A difference 
when using random effects model is the absence of dummy variables. Instead, the random 
variable captures the variation (heterogeneity) in the cross-sectional dimension. Since no 
dummy variables are used in this model, there are fewer parameters to estimate. This saves 
degrees of freedom and produces a more efficient estimation than the fixed effects model. 
Although, the assumptions of the random effects model are stricter than of the fixed effects 
model and is only applicable when the error term is uncorrelated with all of the explanatory 
variables (Brooks, 2008). Random effects model is tested for with a Hausman test. 
 
5.2 OLS assumptions 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is the most frequently used method in regression analysis. The 
method is used to estimate the regression model and investigate the linear relationship 
between the dependent and the independent variables. The use of multiple regression analysis 
requires a number of underlying assumptions for the model to be considered reliable. If the 
assumptions hold, the least square method will work. The estimators determined by OLS will 
then have desirable properties and the estimators can then be considered to be BLUE (Best 
Linear Unbiased Estimators). If the assumptions are violated, this can lead to biased 
coefficient estimates and incorrect inferences (Brooks, 2008).  
 
5.2.1 Stationarity: 𝑬 𝒖𝒕 =   𝟎 
This assumption implies that the residuals must have zero mean. Including an intercept in the 
regression eliminates this problem. There is no need to test for stationarity (Brooks, 2008). 
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5.2.2 Homoscedasticity:  𝒗𝒂𝒓 𝒖𝒕 =   𝝈𝟐 <   ∞ 
This assumption implies that the variance of the errors is constant, this is known as 
homoscedasticity. If the assumption doesn’t hold and the errors do not have a constant 
variance, the standard errors could be wrong and the estimators may generate wrong 
conclusions, this is known as heteroscedasticity. Panel data should not contain any evidence 
of heteroscedasticity. A scatterplot, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test, or White’s test can be 
conducted to detect heteroscedasticity (Brooks, 2008).  
 
5.2.3 No Autocorrelation: 𝒄𝒐𝒗 𝒖𝒊,𝒖𝒋 =   𝟎  𝒇𝒐𝒓  𝒊   ≠ 𝒋 
Another important assumption is autocorrelation. The error terms should be linearly 
independent of one another and occur randomly over time. If there are patterns in the 
residuals, this is called autocorrelation. Autocorrelation generates inefficient coefficients and 
could lead to wrong inference. A Breusch-Godfrey or a Durbin-Watson test can be performed 
to test for autocorrelation. Tests for autocorrelation is mainly relevant to test for when using 
time series data and are difficult to implement on panel data (Brooks, 2008). Especially when 
the cross section units (143 companies) are larger than the time series (eight years). The 
dimension of the data is relatively short, which also makes it difficult to detect a trend over 
time. Therefore, testing for autocorrelation will be excluded in this study.  
 
5.2.4 Exogenous: 𝒄𝒐𝒗 𝒖𝒕,𝒙𝒕 =   𝟎 
The fourth assumption implies that there cannot be any relationship between the error term 
and the independent variables, this is known as exogeneity. If the assumption is violated, the 
regressors are endogenous and the values are determined by the equation instead of outside 
the equation, which is desirable. The assumption can be tested for by a Hausman test (Brooks, 
2008).  
 
5.2.5 Normality: 𝒖𝒕  ~  𝑵(𝟎,𝝈𝟐) 
The assumption about normality is fulfilled when the residuals are normally distributed. 
Normality is determined by looking at the skewness and the kurtosis of the residuals. The 
normal distribution has zero skewness and a kurtosis of three. Normal distribution is tested 
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with a Jarque-Bera test. If the assumption about normality is violated, the problem can be 
corrected by increasing the sample or transforming variables (into natural logarithms) to 
remove outliers. The assumption is no requirement for the model to be effective, but the p-
values can be misleading (Brooks, 2008).  
 
5.2.6 Validity testing 
According to Brooks (2008) there are a number of problems that also have to be controlled for 
the least squares method to work as a suitable model. The following test is necessary when 
using panel data:  
 
5.2.6.1 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when the independent variables are not independent of each other, 
but instead highly correlated with each other. Multicollinearity occurs if any of the variables 
have a correlation value greater than 0.8. If there is, the regression model should be 
reconsidered. A correlation matrix controls for multicollinearity. Multicollinearity can be 
treated in different ways: it can be ignored, increase the sample size, remove one of the 
collinear variables, or transform the highly correlated variables into a ratio (Brooks, 2008).  
 
5.3 The regression model 
 
Regression 1: 𝑪𝑯𝑨𝑰𝑹𝑴𝑨𝑵  𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑷𝑬𝑵𝑺𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵𝒊𝒕 =   𝛼 +   𝛽!𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸!" +  𝛽!𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑇!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹!"  +𝛽!𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐿𝐸𝑉!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷!" + 𝛽!"𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃!" + 𝜀!" 
 
Regression 2: 𝑫𝑰𝑹𝑬𝑪𝑻𝑶𝑹  𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑷𝑬𝑵𝑺𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵𝒊𝒕 =   𝛼 +   𝛽!𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸!" +  𝛽!𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑇!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹!"  +𝛽!𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐿𝐸𝑉!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷!" + 𝛽!"𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃!" + 𝜀!" 
 
Where i=1,...N for each cross-section (firm), t=1,...T for each time period (2006-2013), 𝛼 is 
the intercept. CHAIRMAN COMPENSATION, DIRECTOR COMPENSATION, 𝛽!𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸, 
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and 𝛽!𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 are logarithms of their respective measures in order to reduce presence of 
extreme values and to adjust for the normality in the data. 
 
SIZE = Board size 
BUSY = Busy directors 
FEMALE = Female directors 
INDEPENDENT = Independent directors 
INTERNATIONAL = International directors 
FIRMSIZE = Firm size 
FIRMPERF = Firm performance 
FIRMLEV = Firm leverage 
CEOBOARD = CEO on the board 
OWNERSHIP = Ownership concentration 
 
5.4 Definitions of variables 
As earlier mentioned, the study focuses on examining if there is any relationship between 
board composition and board compensation. By multiple regression analysis, compensation is 
put in relation to earlier mentioned factors, and shows potential relationship between board 
compensation and board composition.  
 
5.4.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable (y) is the variable measured in a test and whose movements the 
regression seeks to explain. The dependent variable “depends” on the independent variable(s) 
(Brooks, 2008). 
 
In order to evaluate the board composition’s impact on board compensation, we have divided 
the compensation data collected into two categories; chairman compensation and average 
director compensation. The compensation variable is separated because of the extensive 
difference of compensation to the chairman compared to other board members. The chairman 
receives higher compensation because of additional duties and responsibilities in the board. 
The compensation variables are composed of two elements; an annual retainer and committee 
pay. We have collected data on the individual remuneration for each chairman for company i 
for year t. In line with previous research on director compensation (Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 
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2010; Crespí-Cladera & Gispert, 2003), average director compensation for company i for year 
t is calculated by dividing total compensation paid to the board for company i for year t 
(excluding remuneration to the chairman) by the number of paid members (excluding the 
chairman) for company i for year t. The CEOs’ are not compensated for their role in the board 
and are therefore not included in our calculation for average director compensation. 
 
The firms in the sample use a fixed annual cash retainer as the basis for remuneration. 
Compensation can consist of either a fixed or variable portion, or a combination of these two. 
Prestige and reputation is another type of compensation for the board of directors, this is not 
treated in this study since it is hard to measure and compare to other compensation forms. The 
variable portion is usually based on attendance at meetings, this is not common in Sweden. 
Therefore, the study will focus on fixed cash compensation that consists of an annual retainer 
and committee pay. Some firms in the sample implement a mixture of cash and synthetic 
shares in their annual retainer, the value of the shares is included in the compensation 
variable. The study does not include other types of compensation, such as options, warrants, 
swaps, or other derivatives in the company since it is not common type of compensation for 
board of directors in Sweden. The data for this variable is retrieved from the companies’ 
annual reports. 
 
5.4.2 Independent variables 
The independent variables (x) are explanatory variables, which are used to explain variation 
in the dependent variables. The independent variables are not affected by other measures 
(Brooks, 2008). Several variables are used to determine the dependent variables in this study. 
How the variables are measured is presented below. All independent variables are collected 
from the companies’ annual reports. 
 
5.4.2.1 Board size 
Board size is measured, in accordance with Barontini and Bozzi (2009), as the number of 
directors on the board (executive and non-executive directors). If a director has resigned or 
acceded, the director is included if he/she had a seat in the board for at least six months of the 
observed year. Board member/director is referred only to such directors elected by the 
companies’ shareholders. Employees’ representatives and deputies are not included since they 
are not compensated for board work. 
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5.4.2.2 Busy directors 
Busy directors are measured as relative percentage of directors that serve on three or more 
other boards relative to board size, which is in line with Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006).  
 
5.4.2.3 Female directors 
This variable is defined as relative percentage of female directors in relation to board size. 
 
5.4.2.4 Independent directors 
Independent directors are defined as relative percentage of independent directors in relation to 
board size. In line with Menozzi et al. (2014), an independent director shall not have 
connections to either the company or major shareholders. According to the Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance (2010) listed companies must clearly state if the company’s directors 
are independent to the company and its shareholders or not. 
 
5.4.2.5 International directors 
This variable is measured as relative percentage directors that are non-Scandinavian in 
relation to board size. 
 
5.4.3 Control variables 
Control variables are defined in order to make the study more reliable and accurate. Control 
variables are constant and test the relative impact of the independent variables (Brooks, 
2008). The control variables make it possible to control for firm-specific factors. The 
definition of control variables is explained in the following section. 
 
5.4.3.1 Firm size 
Firm size is measured, in accordance to Crespí-Cladera and Gispert (2003), as sales turnover. 
Firm size is collected from Datastream.    
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5.4.3.2 Firm performance 
In line with Fernandes (2008), return on equity (ROE) is used as proxy for accounting 
performance. ROE states how much profit a company generates in terms of their invested 
capital. The variable is collected from Datastream. 
 
5.4.3.3 Firm leverage 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total capital. The variable is collected from 
Datastream.  
5.4.4 Dummy variables 
Two of the control variables are dummy variables. A dummy variable is a binary variable, 
which takes the value of either one or zero, indicating the presence or the absence of a 
particular quality. The dummy variables are used as explanatory variables and can be 
interpreted as the average differences in the values of the dependent variable (Brooks, 2008). 
The variables are collected from the companies’ annual reports.  
 
5.4.4.1 Ownership concentration 
In line with Barontini and Bozzi (2009), a dummy takes on the value of 1 if one owner has 
more than 20 % of the votes in the company, otherwise the variable takes on the value of 0.  
 
5.4.4.2 CEO on the board 
A dummy takes on the value of 1 if the CEO is on the board, otherwise 0.   
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5.5 Summary of variables 	  
Dependent variables Definition Source of data 
Chairman compensation The compensation the chairman of the board receives Annual reports 
Average director compensation 
Total director compensation divided 
by the number of directors in the 
board 
Annual reports 
Independent variables Definition Source of data 
Board size Number of directors on the board Annual reports 
Busy directors 
The relative percentage of directors 
serving on three or more other 
boards 
Annual reports 
Female directors The relative percentage of female directors in relation to board size Annual reports 
Independent directors 
The relative percentage of 
independent directors in relation to 
board size 
Annual reports 
International directors 
The relative percentage of 
international directors relative to 
board size 
Annual reports 
Control variables Definition Source of data 
Firm size Sales turnover Datastream 
Firm performance Return on Equity Datastream 
Firm leverage A ratio of total debt to total capital Datastream 
Ownership concentration 
1 if one owner has 20 % or more of 
the votes in the company, otherwise 
0 
Annual reports 
CEO on the board 1 if the CEO is a member of the board, otherwise 0 Annual reports 
 
Table 4. Summary of the study’s variables 
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6. Empirical findings 
 
Section 6 presents the study’s empirical data and results from the regression analysis. 
Descriptive statistics from the sample and results from validity tests are presented.   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
The study includes observations from 43 Swedish companies listed on Stockholm Stock 
Exchange during a period of eight years, 2006 to 2013. Table 5 below presents a summary of 
the statistics of the sample for the variables included in the study. As stated before, the 
variables chairman compensation, average director compensation, board size, and firm size 
have been transformed into natural logarithms (ln) in our regression. The logarithms make the 
variables comparable to the other variables, which are ratios, and adjust for the normality in 
the data.  
 
Compensation to a chairman in the sample is on average 1 232 992 SEK and average for a 
director of a board is 467 086 SEK. The maximum and minimum values show that the 
variables vary a lot in the sample, especially the dependent variables, which support the use of 
fixed effects model. Comparing the average compensation to chairman and the other directors 
of the board among different industries (Appendix 1), gives us an indication where the 
compensation is above, similar, and under the average. The technology industry and 
consumer goods industry are paying their board of directors the highest compensation in our 
sample. The industries with the lowest remuneration levels are oil & gas and consumer 
services. The overall comparison tells us that the differences are not extensive between 
industries. Many of the industries have an average compensation to chairman and the other 
directors of the board similar to the average compensations among companies on Large Cap.   
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   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Observations 
ln Chairman compensation  13.85468  13.91082  15.52037  12.46844  0.573220 330 
Chairman compensation  1232992.  1100000.  5500602.  260000.0  822321.1 330 
ln Average director compensation  12.99184  13.05426  14.03401  11.77529  0.466743 330 
Average director compensation  487160.8  467083.5  1244210.  130000.0  225188.2 330 
ln Board size  2.075190  2.079442  2.564949  1.609438  0.179189 330 
Board size  8.093939  8.000000  13.00000  5.000000  1.454568 330 
Busy directors  0.669875  0.667000  1.000000  0.200000  0.186270 330 
Female directors  0.227339  0.250000  0.571429  0.000000  0.109908 330 
Independent directors  0.626706  0.600000  1.000000  0.200000  0.193533 330 
International directors  0.219943  0.125000  0.910000  0.000000  0.253744 330 
CEO on the board  0.648485  1.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.478168 330 
Ownership concentration  0.757576  1.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.429200 330 
ln Firm size  17.30491  17.34762  19.55327  13.40000  1.230134 330 
Firm size 60677784 34196000 310367000  660000.0 66744980 330 
Firm performance  0.264636  0.177000  14.25100 -0.296000  0.816448 330 
Leverage   0.368722  0.379500  1.247000  0.000000  0.206064 330 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics  
 
6.2 Testing of various regression models 
In appendix 2, the Hausman test is presented. Our first regression, where chairman 
compensation is the dependent variable, is statistically significant at a 5% level. This indicates 
that the random fixed model is not appropriate and the fixed effects specification is to be 
preferred. The second regression, with director compensation as dependent variable, shows a 
p-value of 0.2075, which is not statistically significant. The null hypotheses can’t be rejected 
and random effects model is appropriate for this regression. 
 
In order to determine which fixed effects to use, a Likelihood Ratio Test is conducted to 
determine any redundant fixed effect. The test verifies our observations and indicates that the 
pooled regression cannot be employed. The two fixed effects models, cross-section fixed and 
period fixed, are significant in both regressions (Appendix 3), indicating that fixed effect is 
appropriate in both dimension. When testing the models, a model using only period fixed 
effects is not qualitatively different from the initial pooled regression. The Schwarz criterion, 
which is a criterion for model selection, show that period fixed effects should not be included 
in the model since using only period fixed effects gives a higher Schwarz value than the value 
in the pooled model. When testing for only cross-sectional fixed effect, the Schwarz value is 
lower compared to the pooled regression, indicating to keep cross-sectional fixed effect in the 
regressions (Neath & Cavanaugh, 2011). Therefore a model with cross-section fixed effects is 
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to be utilized. Since it is of interest to compare the regression results, fixed effects model will 
be used for both regressions, even if random effect was appropriate for one regression. 
 
6.3 Validity tests 
As stated earlier, it is important to test for the assumptions underlying the regression model 
before making any interpretation of the results. A number of validity tests have been 
performed to make the regression results more reliable. The results are based on assumptions 
of OLS, presented in chapter 5. Since we have panel data, all assumptions are not necessary to 
test for. The tests performed are for heteroscedasticity, normality, and multicollinearity. The 
problem with stationarity is eliminated since a constant term is included in the regression 
equation, “C”. 
 
6.3.1 Homoscedasticity 
According to the second assumption of OLS, the variance of the residuals should remain 
constant. If the variance doesn’t remain constant, heteroscedasticity exists among the 
residuals. R-square is deteriorated if the residuals are heteroscedastic and this makes it harder 
to find relationships between dependent and independent variables. This may affect the 
regression results.  
 
6.3.1.1 Chairman compensation 
A Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (BPG) test is performed to test for heteroscedasticity, which can 
be find in appendix 4. The p-value is zero to three decimals (0.000531) and the null 
hypothesis about homoscedasticity is rejected. We have evidence of heteroscedasticity. The 
problem with heteroscedasticity is corrected in the specification for the regression, where 
“white diagonal” is chosen. This eliminates the problem with heteroscedasticity.  
 
6.3.1.2 Director compensation  
A BPG test has been conducted for regression 2 as well (Appendix 4). As in the previous test, 
the null hypothesis about homoscedasticity is rejected and we have heteroscedasticity in the 
model. The function “white diagonal” is chosen to eliminate the problem for 
heteroscedasticity. 
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6.3.2 Normality 
To test for normality, a Jarque-Bera test is performed. This test is presented through a chart of 
bars, where the mean, median, skewness, and kurtosis are some of the values displayed. The 
normal distribution has a skewness of zero and a kurtosis of three. If the residuals are not 
normally distributed, the results can be inaccurate. The problem of non-normality can be 
caused from a small sample or outliers. To decrease the risk of non-normality, selected 
variables have been transformed into natural logarithms to eliminate the effect of outliers. 
  
6.3.2.1 Chairman compensation 
The Jarque-Bera test in appendix 5 shows a skewness of -0.151, which is close to zero, and 
indicating that the distribution is symmetric about its mean value. The kurtosis has a value of 
2.831, which is close to three, and indicating that our data has a leptokurtic distribution. The 
p-value is 0.438 and the hypothesis about normality cannot be rejected. We have normality.  
   
6.3.2.2 Director compensation 
Appendix 5 shows a normally distributed curve. The normality test has a skewness of -0.299 
and kurtosis is 3.065. Both values are close to the desired values for normality. The p-value 
(0.077) clarifies significance at a 10% level; the null hypothesis about normality is rejected. 
Though, observing the staple of bars in appendix 5, the test shows a normally distributed 
curve with acceptable values of the skewness and kurtosis. 
 
6.3.3 Multicollinearity  
As stated in chapter 5, multicollinearity occurs if two or more independent variables are 
highly correlated with each other. According to Brooks (2008), the variables are highly 
correlated if the correlation between two or more independent variables is 0.8 or above. The 
correlation explains how well the linear association between the variables is and that 
movement in the variables is usually related to the extent of the correlation coefficient 
(Brooks, 2008). If multicollinearity exists, R-square can show abnormal results and the model 
will look better than it actually is. 
 
To control for multicollinearity, a correlation matrix has been constructed (Appendix 6). The 
correlation coefficients presented in the table indicate that there are no independent variables 
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that have a value of 0.8 or above. Multicollinearity is not present in the data sample. The 
independent variables with highest correlation are board size and firm size, with a correlation 
of 0.57.  
 
6.4 Regression results 
Two regressions have been performed in this study, the impact of the observed variables on 
compensation to the chairman of the board and the impact of the observed variables on 
average compensation to other directors on the board.  
 
Variable Chairman compensation Prob. 
Average director 
compensation Prob. 
Board size 0.024610 0.7877 -0.052271 0.6007 
Busy directors -0.116278 0.1075 -0.058270 0.3988 
Female directors 0.465671*** 0.0056 0.543037*** 0.0004 
Independent directors 0.284173** 0.0172 0.159855 0.1767 
International directors 0.394561** 0.0345 0.394994* 0.0572 
CEO on the board -0.016670 0.7667 -0.034714 0.5402 
Ownership concentration 0.005081 0.9158 0.006946 0.8862 
Firm size 0.199210*** 0.0000 0.177005*** 0.0003 
Firm performance -0.003259 0.6435 -0.002421 0.7887 
Firm leverage 0.133742 0.2029 0.050854 0.6237 
R-squared 0.950508   0.923550   
Prop (F-statistic) 0.000000   0.000000   
*** = Significant at 1% level 
** = Significant at 5% level 
* = Significant at 10% level 
Table 6. Regression results  
 
The correlation coefficient, R-square, is a measure of how well the regression model fits the 
data and how much of the variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the 
regression. R-square must have a value between 0 and 1, the value of 1 indicates that the 
model fits the data well and if the value is 0 the model fits the data poor (Brooks, 2008). The 
R-squared values are high for both regressions. The model succeeds to 95.05% explain the 
variation in chairman compensation and to 92.36% explain the variation in board member 
compensation. The high R-square values may be a result of not enough number of 
observations. Although, we have included all companies on Large Cap during the observed 
time period, with exclusions for financial companies. These values are higher than previous 
studies by Crespí-Cladera and Gispert (2003) and Barontini and Bozzi (2009), this may be 
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due to that the regressions includes different variables and have different time periods. These 
studies also have a larger number of observations, which can be an explanation. 
 
6.4.1 Verification or rejection of hypotheses 
The results for our five independent board variables; board size, busy directors, female 
directors, independent directors, and international directors, are presented below. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a negative relationship between board size and chairman 
compensation.  
 
The size of the board of directors varies between 5 and 13 directors among the companies 
observed. A board has on average 8 board members. The result shows no statistically 
significant relationship between board size and chairman compensation, the hypothesis about 
a negative relationship between the two variables is rejected.   
 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative relationship between board size and average director 
compensation.   
 
The result of this test also shows an unidentified significant relationship between the size of 
the board and director compensation. The hypothesis is rejected and the level of compensation 
to directors is not related to board size.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relationship between busy directors and chairman 
compensation.  
 
Directors active in more than three boards are common among the included companies and on 
average, 67% of the boards have busy directors. The minimum ratio of busy directors in the 
sample is 20% and maximum is 100%. There is no statistically significant relationship find 
between busy directors and compensation to the chairman. The hypothesis is rejected.   
 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a positive relationship between busy directors and average director 
compensation.  
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The p-value for hypothesis 2b is 0.3988 and is not statistically significant. The hypothesis is 
rejected and the variable busy directors cannot be said to have any impact on compensation to 
directors. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a negative relationship between female directors and chairman 
compensation.  
 
Having a female director on the board is common in Sweden and 94.77% of the observed 
boards have at least one female director. The mean value for female directors in the board is 
22.73%. A statistically significant relationship is find between female directors and chairman 
compensation and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The relationship is significant at a 
1% level. Surprisingly, the relationship between female directors and chairman compensation 
is positive, which means that chairman compensation statistically will increase when the share 
of female directors increase in the board. Hypothesis 3a about a negative relationship is 
therefore rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: There is a negative relationship between female directors and average 
director compensation.  
 
A significant relationship can be identified between female directors and compensation to 
directors. The relationship is significant at a 1% level. As for hypothesis 3a, the result shows a 
positive relationship between the two variables, instead of the predicted negative relationship. 
The average director compensation increases when the proportion of female directors on the 
board increases. Hypothesis 3b is rejected.    
 
Hypothesis 4a: There is a positive relationship between independent directors and chairman 
compensation.  
 
According to Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (2010), a majority of the board 
members, elected at the general council, shall be independent of the company and its 
management. A board in our sample has on average 63% independent directors. Independent 
directors show a positive statistically significant impact on chairman compensation at a 5% 
level. This indicates an increase in compensation to the chairman of the board when the 
number of independent directors increases. 
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Hypothesis 4b: There is a positive relationship between independent directors and average 
director compensation.  
 
The relationship between average director compensation and independent directors shows a p-
value of 0.1767 and no significant relationship can be stated. The hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 5a: There is a positive relationship between international directors and chairman 
compensation.  
 
In 41% of the boards included in the study had an international director for at least one year of 
the observed time period and a board consists on average of 22% international directors. It 
can be concluded from the results that international directors have positive significant impact 
on chairman compensation. The relationship is statistically significant at a 5% level. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: There is a positive relationship between international directors and average 
director compensation.  
 
We find a positive statistically significant relationship at a 10% level for hypothesis 5b. 
The positive connection indicates that more international directors on the board, increases the 
average director compensation.   
 
6.4.3 Control variables 
Firm size: Firm size, measured as sales turnover, shows strong significant (1% level) positive 
impact on both dependent variables. Resulting in the conclusion that the larger the firm is 
(higher sales turnover), the higher compensation the chairman and other directors on the 
board will receive. 
 
Firm performance: Firm performance, measured as ROE, shows no significant impact on 
either of the dependent variables in the regressions. Board compensation is not affected by the 
firm’s profitability. 
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Firm leverage: No significant relationship between leverage of the firm and the dependent 
variables can be found.  
 
Ownership concentration: The variable ownership concentration has no significant impact 
on either of the dependent variables. 
 
CEO on the board: The results indicate no significant relationship between having the CEO 
on the board and the compensation to the board of directors. The compensation to any board 
member is indifferent to whether the CEO is a member of the board or not. 
 
6.4.4 Summary of empirical findings 
After running the regression 1, it turns out that the significant determinants of compensation 
to the chairman are female directors, independent directors, international directors, and the 
size of the firm. The correlations between chairman compensation and these variables are 
positive. 
 
The results from regression 2 show a positive significant relationship between director 
compensation and female directors, international directors, and firm size. This result is almost 
consistent, except for independent directors, with the results from regression 1. 
 
The constant variable is strongly significant for both equations, indicating that the average 
chairman compensation and board member compensation is different from zero. The F-
statistic probability in the regressions shows that our models are strongly significant. 
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Hypotheses   Rejection of hypothesis 
Expected 
relationship Actual relationship 
Hypothesis 1 
a: Larger boards decrease the 
compensation to the chairman Yes Negative 
Positive,                      
not significant 
  
b: Larger boards decrease the 
compensation to a director Yes Negative 
Negative,                                                 
not significant 
Hypothesis 2 
a: A higher proportion of busy 
directors increase the 
compensation to the chairman 
Yes Positive Negative,                                                 
not significant 
  
b: A higher proportion of busy 
directors increase the 
compensation to a director 
Yes Positive Negative,                                                 
not significant 
Hypothesis 3 
a: A higher proportion of female 
directors decrease the 
compensation to the chairman 
Yes Negative Positive 
  
b: A higher proportion of female 
directors decrease the 
compensation to a director 
Yes Negative Positive 
Hypothesis 4 
a: A higher proportion of 
independent directors increase 
the compensation to the chairman 
No Positive Positive 
  
b: A higher proportion of 
independent directors increase 
the compensation to a director 
Yes Positive Positive,                      
not significant 
Hypothesis 5 
a: A higher proportion of 
international directors increase 
the compensation to the chairman 
No Positive Positive 
  
b: A higher proportion of 
international directors increase 
the compensation to a director 
No Positive Positive 
Table 7. Summary of hypotheses and empirical findings  
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7. Analysis 
 
The following chapter analyzes the empirical findings in accordance to theory and a 
comparison with prior research is conducted.  
 
7.1 Changes in board compensation from 2006 to 2013  
Chairman and directors compensation show a positive trend during the study’s time period, 
which can be found in appendix 7. The two compensation variables have moved equivalent 
during the years. The compensation increased the first years, up to 2009, when the 
compensation stalled or decreased for two years. An economic boom with high growth in 
Sweden at that time can explain the increase during the first years. In 2008, the financial crisis 
entered, which led to a sharp deterioration of the economic situation. The years 2009 and 
2010 differ from the remaining years, which correspond to the global economic downturn 
during those years, which occurred as a result of the financial crisis. The economy in Sweden 
started to recover during 2010, which resulted in increased compensation levels again 
(Konjunkturinstitutet, 2011). The compensation levels have though not increased in the same 
rate from 2011 to 2013 as before the financial crisis. Between 2006 and 2008, the chairman 
compensation level increased by 14.45%, compared to the 8.01% increase after the financial 
crisis. Biggest annual increases were seen in 2011 when chairman and director compensation 
increased 8-9% compared to the previous year. The increase in compensation over the years is 
in line with previous research. Andreas, Rapp, and Wolff (2010) conducted their study of 
German companies during the period of 2005-2008 and find a steady increase in director 
compensation during those four years. Menozzi et al. (2014) study shows an increase in 
remuneration to board of directors in another European country, Italy, during 1994-2004. 
Even if these studies are performed during other time periods, it is of interest to observe the 
development of compensation levels to board of directors before our time period as well.   
 
Most of the companies compensate their board of directors with a pre-determined annual cash 
retainer. According to the agency theory, this can result in an increased risk for agency 
conflicts between the owners and the board since the remuneration is less dependent on the 
companies’ performance. It has though become more common in recent years among the 
companies in our sample to split the annual retainer in cash and synthetic shares to create a 
more long-term approach. The remuneration is then linked to the companies’ long-term 
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development, according to the agency theory, which will benefit the company by increasing 
the motivation of the board to perform their work.  
 
7.2 Analysis of regression results  
The outcome of our results differs for some variables, compared to previous results that form 
the basis for our hypotheses. We can find statistically significant relationships in three out of 
five independent variables. These three are female directors, independent directors, and 
international directors. Female and international directors are positively related to both 
compensation variables, while independent directors show a statistically significant 
relationship in one regression. In regards of the control variables, firm size is the statistically 
significant variable find. Firm performance, firm leverage, CEO on the board, and ownership 
concentration is not find to have an impact on either compensation variables. 
 
Why the results differ for some variables and conform for others compared to previous studies 
is discussed below, with a specific section for each of the independent variables and control 
variables. A possible reason for deviating results is our market and sample. No earlier 
research has been performed in the Swedish settings. Previous research we have compared 
with is conducted in Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and United States of America. Different 
laws, ownership structures, and tolerance towards high compensation to board of directors are 
some factors that differ among the countries.   
 
7.2.1 Board size 
Similar to Fernandes (2008), board size shows no statistically significant impact on 
compensation to board of directors. A small or a large board does not have effect on the 
remuneration a chairman or a director of the board receives. The result is surprising since 
Menozzi et al. (2014) find, with support of previous research, that board size is one of the 
most important elements of determining the compensation to the board. Ryan and Wiggins 
(2004) and Menozzi et al. (2014) find evidence of a negative relationship between board size 
and remuneration, this is explained by the fact that smaller boards are more effective at 
monitoring and controlling a company and its management, and therefore perform a better 
work relative to larger boards. Larger boards are less effective monitors and thereby increase 
agency costs in the company, which is an important aspect of the agency theory. Ryan and 
Wiggins (2004) and Menozzi et al. (2014) are based on other settings than this study and 
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these studies are conducted on earlier time periods, which can be reasons for why we did not 
find any significant relationship between board size and compensation. 
 
7.2.2 Busy directors 
The hypotheses stated a positive relationship between busy directors and compensation to the 
chairman and an average director of the board. No significant relationships can be identified 
in the regressions. The outcome of the tests differs relative to previous studies (Brick, 
Palmon, & Wald, 2006; Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003) where findings support the 
hypotheses of a positive significant relationship between busy directors and board 
compensation. Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) and Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) 
are observing companies in the U.S. settings. The U.S. and Sweden have different corporate 
governance systems. The U.S. belongs to the Anglo-Saxon system and the Swedish 
governance system is more comparable to the Germanic system. The Anglo-Saxon system 
compensates the board of directors with company shares and the compensation is 
performance based to a greater extent than in the Germanic system. These different 
governance systems and compensation structures can be reasons why our expected outcomes 
of the hypotheses were not fulfilled. The time period used for the study also affects the 
results. Their studies have a time period between 1992 and 2001. This is almost a decade 
before the time period of our study. Another reason why the variable busy directors cannot 
explain the variation in the compensation can be that other variables observed have a stronger 
impact on the compensation. 
 
Since no statistically significant relationship could be identified between busy directors and 
compensation given to the chairman or an average director, the perceived knowledge and 
experiences busy directors bring to the board is not as exceptional as believed. Their 
contribution to the board may still be of value, but not in terms of affecting the compensation 
levels. According to the resource dependence theory, the compensation should be based on 
the contribution every director brings to the board and busy directors bring corporate 
governance experiences. It can be that the value of the resources every director brings to the 
board is hard to measure and it can sometimes be hard to measuring the performance by the 
board of directors since the boards are not involved in the operating activities in the company. 
According to this result, the boards are not compensated in line with resource dependence 
theory. 
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7.2.3 Female directors 
The third board composition variable, female directors, is find statistically significant, 
indicating that the level of chairman and director compensation is related to the share of 
female directors on the board. The reason for lack of studies around this area can be that the 
remuneration usually is the same among the board of directors, regardless of gender. The 
hypotheses about female directors are based on general studies and facts from differences in 
compensation levels between men and women generally. However, the expected hypotheses 
about negative relationships were not fulfilled, and instead, positive relationships is find. Our 
interpretation that women generally have lower pay than men is not applicable to the 
remuneration of boards in Sweden. The indication from the study performed by Allbright 
(2013) about women having a negative impact on board remuneration does not collaborate 
with our results. The remuneration levels may be more even across the boards than other 
institutions in the society. In most of the examined companies, all directors (except the 
chairman) are given the same base compensation even though the compensation should be 
determined individually, and having females on the board does not seem to affect this 
compensation setup negatively. A probable explanation for this is the shared responsibility 
among the board members and there should be equal compensation for equal work and 
responsibilities. The result can depend on the type of companies and industries female 
directors choose to operate in. Some industries pay more to the board of directors than others, 
even though the variation is not that large.  
 
An increase of the portion of female directors in the board may mean a more diversified board 
compared to a board only consisting of men. According to Lynall, Golden, and Hillman 
(2003), a diversified board with varying experiences and expertise will enhance the work 
performed by the board. Our outcome is in line with the resource dependence perspective, 
level of resource contribution and diversified boards are motives for increasing compensation 
to the board. Female directors can contribute with other resources and perspectives than men 
and it is important to have a diversified board to provide a broader perspective.  
 
7.2.4 Independent directors  
A strong statistically positively significant relationship at a 5% level is find between 
independent directors and compensation to the chairman. This result is in line with Andreas, 
Rapp, and Wolff (2010), who also find a significant positive relationship between 
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independent directors and board compensation. The shareholders prefer independent directors 
since these directors have an objective view without any attachments to the company. 
Independent directors have become an integral part of boards in order to align the interest of 
owners and shareholders and to reduce agency conflicts in the company. As the results show, 
shareholders are willing to enhance the level of compensation to the chairman if there are 
more independent directors in the board acting on behalf of the shareholders. 
 
A statistically significant relationship cannot be identified between independent directors and 
the compensation given to the other directors of the board. This outcome is in line with 
studies conducted by Menozzi et al. (2014) and Fernandes (2008). Menozzi et al. (2014) on 
the other hand could identify a positive relation between the two variables, but only in 
correspondence to when firm performance was increasing as well. The Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance states that a majority of the board has to consist of independent 
directors. The agency theory also implies that the board of directors should consist of a 
majority of independent directors since these directors provide a more effective monitoring of 
the management. Considering it has been statutory for a long time in Sweden with 
independent directors in the board, this can imply that increasing the share of independent 
directors in the board will not result in any additional compensation to the board. 
 
The outcome shows that the proportion of independent directors affects the compensation 
given to the chairman of the board, but not the compensation to the other directors in the 
board. These results show an indication of asymmetry in development of compensation to the 
board. The results are surprising since more independent directors are more effective monitors 
and inherent agency conflict. Less agency problems results in more satisfied shareholders, 
which motivate an increase to every director on the board, and not only to the chairman. The 
fact that the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance has clarified restrictions about 
definitions and number of independent directors during the years can be reason for the 
outcome. A majority of the board has to consist of independent directors nowadays, and this 
does not make independent directors unique to the same extent as earlier. It may be that 
independent directors had an effect on director compensation earlier but not anymore, when it 
has become more restricted and is more common. This is shown from our regression about 
director compensation. It is not shown in the other regression, where the relationship exists. 
But in some years, independent directors’ impact on chairman compensation may not exist 
either.  
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7.2.5 International directors 
The regression results show that international directors have a positive statistically significant 
impact on both chairman and director compensation. Previous research (Elston & Goldberg, 
2003; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2005) has shown that compensation levels differ substantially 
across countries, for example; the U.S. has significantly higher compensation levels than 
Sweden. The result gives an indication of that having more international board members leads 
to higher compensation, which is not surprising. To be able to attract people from other 
countries, where compensation levels are higher, the company may have to increase the 
remuneration or offer something else in return. It is hard to say if the positive correlation 
depends on if international directors demand higher compensation to accept board 
appointments in Sweden, or if Swedish companies offer higher compensation levels to attract 
these people. It is assumed to be beneficial for the company to have foreign board members 
since it increases diversification and bring different perspectives to the board. Having an 
international board member removes barriers between Sweden and other countries, which is 
beneficial in a greater international society and the process of today’s globalization. Looking 
at the sample, 62.8% of the companies represented have had international directors on the 
board during a majority of the observed time period. This seems like a low proportion of the 
companies, since most of them are internationally connected and should benefit from having 
international board members.  
 
From a resource dependence perspective, international directors in the board can lead to a 
more international perspective. These directors enter with other types of knowledge and 
experiences, and can bring useful resources and networks to the company that Swedish board 
members cannot. This makes the board able to bring more resources to the firm and its 
management. Compensation is therefore higher in boards with more international directors. 
Even though the costs for the compensation increases, the costs can bring benefits for the 
company in form of example international experiences. Our result that international directors 
have a positive impact on the compensation is in line with the resource dependence theory. 
 
7.2.6 Firm size 
Corresponding with the majority of previous financial research, our result indicates that firm 
size has a significant and positive effect on chairman and director compensation in Sweden. 
This is consistent with previous research (Crespí-Cladera & Gispert, 2003; Ryan & Wiggins, 
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2004; Menozzi et al., 2014). Firm size is considered in this study as an important variable 
explaining the variation in board compensation. The positive link between firm size and board 
compensation supports the theory that larger firms require increased incentives for successful 
monitoring. This is consistent with the agency theory that the board needs incentives to 
perform the required duties and act in the best interest of the company. The designs of 
efficient contracts and linking board compensation to company size are ways to reduce 
agency costs, which arises from the separation of ownership and control. The work done by 
the board of directors in larger companies often requires a higher level of knowledge and 
expertise. A positive relationship between these variables is logical; the more complex and 
large the role of being a member of the board is, the larger amount of compensation is needed 
to be able to attract the most suitable and experienced directors.  
 
7.2.7 Firm performance 
The results of our regressions show that measure of accounting performance do not have any 
significant impact on chairman or director compensation. This is inconsistent with previous 
research that find a positive significant relationship between board compensation and firm 
performance (Crespí-Cladera & Gispert, 2003). Following agency theory, firm performance 
would have a positive effect on compensation due to the alignment with shareholders interest. 
This because, it seems logic that an increasing firm performance, and probably then a good 
yield for the shareholders, lead to a raise in the compensation to board of directors since the 
compensation is determined by the shareholders.  
 
The differences in our outcome relative to other studies can depend on type of remuneration 
considered (fixed salary, variable salary, cash, stock, options) and chosen measure of firm 
performance. Menozzi et al. (2014), who measures performance as ROE, does not find any 
link between board compensation and firm performance. In Sweden, a board of directors is 
paid mainly by an annual cash retainer, which is not tied to the company’s performance. It is 
not common in Sweden and the Germanic governance system to compensate the directors 
with performance-based incentives, and therefore firm performance is not a determinant of 
board compensation in Sweden. Our results suggest that Swedish directors are not paid in 
accordance to the agency theory to aligning the board with shareholders interest.  
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7.2.8 Firm leverage  
Leverage does not have any significant effect on board compensation, and this is in line with 
Crespí-Cladera and Gispert (2003) who in their study did not find any significant result that 
leverage plays a role in establishing the boards’ compensation. Brick, Palmon, and Wald 
(2006) on the other hand find that director compensation is positively related to leverage. A 
reason for a non-relationship might be that the work performed by the board of directors 
needs to be done, even if the company has troubles performing on the market. The work for 
the board of directors will stay intact, in good or bad times for the firm. It is then compelling 
to keep a stable compensation and not let other factors like leverage affect it.  
 
7.2.9 Ownership concentration 
The result shows no significant relationship between ownership concentration and directors’ 
compensation levels. Previous research (Barontini & Bozzi, 2009) find evidence on the Italian 
market that ownership concentration has a negative effect on board compensation. The 
agency theory states that ownership concentration relates to compensation by the fact that 
boards in companies with high ownership concentration receive lower compensation than in 
companies with dispersed ownership. More monitoring of management is more necessary in 
companies with dispersed ownership, which results in higher agency costs. Like Italy, 
Sweden is a country with high ownership concentration and a negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and board compensation was expected. Of the companies observed, 
77% have concentrated ownership. The high ownership concentration in Sweden, which 
should result in less monitoring necessary by the board and decreased compensation to the 
board of directors, does not seem like an affecting factor in our sample. Our result suggests 
that boards in Sweden are not compensated for their monitoring role in line with agency 
theory. 
 
7.2.10 CEO on the board  
In 74.4% of the observations, the CEO has been a member of the board for at least one year of 
the time period. Presence of the CEO on the board shows no significant results. This result is 
inconsistent with Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) who find a positive relationship in their 
study between having the CEO on the board and the boards’ remuneration. Their study was 
conducted in other settings where the CEO is allowed to hold the position as chairman of the 
board. This can be an explainable reason for the difference in our result. In Sweden, the 
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ownership structure is highly concentrated, whereas the study performed by Brick, Palmon, 
and Wald (2006) is on the American market where the ownership is mainly dispersed. 
Dispersed ownership gives the CEO more power to influence the board of directors and can 
therefore impact on the compensation given to the CEO. Due to the positive relationship find 
in Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) between CEO compensation and board compensation, this 
will indirectly influence the compensation to the board of directors. In Sweden, the CEOs 
does not get any extra remuneration for board positions, which makes it harder to see any 
connection to how CEOs’ presence in the boards enhance the average compensation to 
chairman or directors.  
 
7.3 Limitations 
The data in this study covers a time period from 2006 to 2013. Therefore, the results of the 
study are restricted to this time frame and it is possible that they are driven by events, such as 
the financial crisis that started 2008. Further, observing one country, in this case Sweden, 
limits the ability to generalize results to other countries. However, our findings may be 
generalizable to companies in countries that are similar to Sweden in terms of cultures, 
legislation, and governance system. Our findings provide useful insight into corporate 
governance and board of directors’ issues 
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8. Conclusion 
 
Conclusions of our results and analysis are presented in this last section. The study’s 
research question is answered and the purpose is fulfilled. The chapter ends with suggestions 
for additional research. 
 
8.1 Discussion and conclusion 
Corporate governance and the board of directors have been debated due to governance 
failures and regulatory changes, which have increased research about the compensation to the 
board of directors. Board of directors and their compensation present an important corporate 
governance component and from a theoretical point of view, the composition of the board is 
an important mechanism of their compensation. The purpose of this study is to investigate if 
factors associated with the composition of the board affect the compensation given to the 
board of directors in Sweden. Five determinants of the board structure have been examined; 
board size, busy directors, female directors, independent directors, and international directors. 
Each board characteristic is considered to pursue a relevant role on the level of compensation 
paid to the board of directors. The characteristics are selected based on evidence from 
previous studies, theories, and diversification factors of having an impact on board 
compensation. 
 
Using a data set covering the list of Large Cap on Stockholm Stock Exchange for the period 
2006-2013, our descriptive statistics disclose that average compensation per chairman is 1 
232 992 SEK and average compensation per director is 467 086 SEK (Table 5). The 
descriptive statistics shows an upward trend in board compensation. Chairman compensation 
has risen annually at a rate of 4.34% and average director compensation has risen at a 
comparable rate of 4.17%. In the study we discover that only some of the firms in our sample 
use share-based remuneration as a portion in the annual retainer.  
 
After the required tests have been performed, we find significant support that board of 
directors’ compensation is related to some board characteristics and company size. Female 
directors and international directors in the board positively influence the level of 
compensation given to the chairman and the other directors on the board. Independent 
directors are associated with higher compensation levels to the chairman of the board, and no 
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association can be find between independent directors and per director compensation. No 
relationship can be identified between the size of the board and the compensation. If a director 
is “busy”, it does not have an impact on board compensation either. The study finds that firm 
size positively influence the compensation levels. Firm performance, firm leverage, having 
the CEO on the board, or the company’s ownership concentration are not influencing factors 
in deciding board of directors’ compensation. 
 
The outcome suggests that the chairman of a board in Sweden is compensated for having 
female, international, and independent directors in their boards and for having a large sales 
turnover. Meanwhile, an average director of a board in Sweden is rewarded for having female 
and international directors in their boards, and for having a large sales turnover. The results 
imply that the variables affecting the level of board compensation are variables that can be 
classified as diversification variables. More female directors and more international directors 
in the board increase the compensation to the entire board. The shareholders show their 
appreciation to a diversified board by a higher compensation level. These results are 
supported by the resource dependence theory, where the compensation is a factor of the 
amount of resources a director brings to the board and a diversified board. Busy directors 
however show a result that is not in line with this perspective on board compensation. Boards 
of directors are not compensated for the experiences and knowledge busy directors bring to 
the boards.  
 
The governance form in Sweden is based on norms of collective responsibility and voluntary 
compliance, which is aligned with the basic assumptions of the stewardship theory. The result 
from our study is not in line with the stewardship perspective that compensation is not needed 
for incentives. A relationship between firm size and compensation speaks more towards the 
agency perspective. Our sample shows that some companies have started to pay their directors 
with synthetic shares during the recent years to create a more long-term perspective for the 
board work. If this trend, towards more performance-based compensation, continues, the 
agency theory will be a relevant predictor of board of directors’ compensation. Our results 
lead to the conclusion that a resource dependence perspective is relevant in determining board 
of directors’ compensation in Sweden.  
 
Some of our result confirms results from previous research, but not all. Explanations for 
different results are the difference in time periods and the different countries where the studies 
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have been conducted. Different settings are based on different governance systems and 
regulations. During our time period, a financial crisis occurs, which influences the 
compensation levels to board of directors. This influence can affect the determinants of board 
compensation and the possible effect board structure has on board compensation. These 
factors are important to have in mind when comparing the results. Our findings contribute to 
prior research regarding determinants of the compensation level to board of directors in 
Sweden. 
 
8.2 Additional research 
Future research on this area can investigate other markets. Mid Cap or Small Cap can be of 
interest to see if the results will be the same. Another interesting extension would be to 
include more countries and compare these to each other, especially to compare countries with 
different corporate governance systems and compensation structures to examine if there are 
any “best ways” to pay the board of directors. In addition, a qualitative research structured by 
interviews with directors and managers can also be done. Other interesting areas for future 
research would be to examine other possible determinants of board of directors’ 
compensation, for example including an industry variable and investigating if the type of 
industry has impact on the compensation level, or CEO compensation to examine if there are 
a relationship between CEO compensation and the compensation given to the board of 
directors. 
 
Since an enhancing pattern of synthetic shares among companies in our sample can be 
identified, a similar study like this will be interesting to conduct in the future. If the trend 
continues, it is of interest to examine the compensation structure among Swedish boards with 
a focus on the agency theory. The compensation would then mainly be determined by the 
work and effort accomplished by the board of directors and move away from today’s pre-
determined cash retainer.  
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Appendix 
 
      
Appendix 1 – Compensation levels among industries 
 
Industry Average chairman compensation (SEK) 
Average director 
compensation (SEK) 
Consumer goods 1 411 981 586 310 
Consumer services 908 813 366 225 
Health care 1 458 737 470 995 
Industrials 1 112 272 450 845 
Materials 1 009 569 414 111 
Oil & gas 805 058 511 648 
Technology 2 253 125 568 094 
Telecom 1 184 137 627 323 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 – Hausman test 
 
 
Hausman test for regression 1, chairman compensation 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 22.938612 10 0.0110 
    
Random effects model can be rejected as the Hausman test show a significant value (Prob. = 
0.0110) at 5% level. The null hypothesis that the random effects model is a good estimator is 
therefore rejected.  
 
 
Hausman test for regression 2, director compensation 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 13.298181 10 0.2075 
     
      
Random effects model cannot be rejected as the Hausman test show a value of Prob. = 0.2075 
at 5%. The null hypothesis that the random effects model is a good estimator is not rejected. 
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Appendix 3 –Fixed effects test  
   
   
Fixed effects test for regression 1, chairman compensation 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 57.381668 (42,270) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 757.403240 42 0.0000 
Period F 17.811070 (7,270) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 125.283508 7 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 50.882821 (49,270) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 767.495461 49 0.0000 
 
The results of the test show a high significant value (0.0000). The specification shows that 
“fixed effects” is a suitable model for both cross-section and period. 
 
 
Fixed effects test for regression 2, director compensation 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 50.249061 (42,279) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 728.040174 42 0.0000 
Period F 16.982296 (7,279) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 120.320862 7 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 44.749058 (49,279) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 739.511962 49 0.0000 
     
      
The result for regression 2 show, as well for regression 1, the highest level of significance 
(0.0000) in both cross section fixed and period fixed. 
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Appendix 4 – Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroscedasticity 
 
 
Heteroscedasticity test for regression 1, chairman compensation 
 
Dependent Variable: SQ_RESIDCHAIR  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/16/15   Time: 10:40   
Sample: 2006 2013   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 43   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 330  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LOG_BOARDSIZE 0.067415 0.061444 1.097183 0.2734 
BUSY_DIRECTORS 0.004315 0.048609 0.088763 0.9293 
FEMALE_DIRECTORS -0.089299 0.083022 -1.075612 0.2829 
INDEPENDENT_DIRECTORS -0.095623 0.051237 -1.866307 0.0629 
INTERNATIONAL_DIRECTORS -0.022911 0.039717 -0.576849 0.5644 
CEO_ON_THE_BOARD -0.062480 0.022385 -2.791211 0.0056 
OWNERSHIP_CONCENTRATION -0.060237 0.021179 -2.844161 0.0047 
LOG_FIRMSIZE -0.003273 0.008571 -0.381926 0.7028 
FIRM_VALUE -0.022514 0.010814 -2.082061 0.0381 
LEVERAGE 0.201969 0.043845 4.606454 0.0000 
C 0.130276 0.138251 0.942319 0.3467 
     
     R-squared 0.092265    Mean dependent var 0.113512 
Adjusted R-squared 0.063809    S.D. dependent var 0.153813 
S.E. of regression 0.148825    Akaike info criterion -0.939323 
Sum squared resid 7.065517    Schwarz criterion -0.812686 
Log likelihood 165.9882    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.888809 
F-statistic 3.242406    Durbin-Watson stat 0.621044 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000531    
     
      
The test show a significant value of 0.000531 and the null hypothesis about homoscedasticity 
is rejected. We have evidence of heteroscedasticity. 
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Heteroscedasticity test for regression 2, director compensation 
 
Dependent Variable: SQ_RESIDDIR  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/16/15   Time: 10:39   
Sample: 2006 2013   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 43   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 339  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LOG_BOARDSIZE -0.179415 0.056712 -3.163638 0.0017 
BUSY_DIRECTORS -0.046969 0.045089 -1.041700 0.2983 
FEMALE_DIRECTORS -0.223475 0.075935 -2.942981 0.0035 
INDEPENDENT_DIRECTORS 0.072472 0.047376 1.529713 0.1271 
INTERNATIONAL_DIRECTORS 0.034271 0.036623 0.935762 0.3501 
CEO_ON_THE_BOARD -0.012338 0.020382 -0.605311 0.5454 
OWNERSHIP_CONCENTRATION -0.017791 0.019657 -0.905111 0.3661 
LOG_FIRMSIZE 0.015879 0.007804 2.034692 0.0427 
FIRM_VALUE -0.016029 0.010076 -1.590878 0.1126 
LEVERAGE 0.138120 0.040251 3.431479 0.0007 
C 0.204106 0.125284 1.629151 0.1042 
     
     R-squared 0.133463    Mean dependent var 0.102120 
Adjusted R-squared 0.107044    S.D. dependent var 0.146968 
S.E. of regression 0.138880    Akaike info criterion -1.078509 
Sum squared resid 6.326309    Schwarz criterion -0.954362 
Log likelihood 193.8073    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.029037 
F-statistic 5.051809    Durbin-Watson stat 0.690488 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
     
      
The test show a significant value of 0.000001 and the null hypothesis is rejected. We have 
tendency for heteroscedasticity in the data. 
 
 
Appendix 5 – Jarque-Bera test for normality 
 
Normality test for regression 1, chairman compensation 
 
0
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-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2013
Observations 330
Mean      -3.91e-15
Median   0.032467
Maximum  0.953760
Minimum -0.879685
Std. Dev.   0.337427
Skewness  -0.151094
Kurtosis   2.830581
Jarque-Bera  1.650278
Probability  0.438174
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Normality test for regression 2, director compensation 
 
0
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-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2013
Observations 339
Mean      -1.11e-15
Median   0.036780
Maximum  0.762128
Minimum -0.894391
Std. Dev.   0.320034
Skewness  -0.299165
Kurtosis   3.065122
Jarque-Bera  5.116643
Probability  0.077435
 
 
 
Appendix 6 – Correlation matrix 
 
Variables SIZE 
BUS
Y 
FEM
ALE 
INDEPEN
DENT 
INTERNAT
IONAL 
CEOBO
ARD 
OWNER
SHIP 
FIRM
SIZE 
FIRMP
ERF FIRMLEV 
SIZE 1                   
BUSY 
0.0999
98 1                 
FEMALE 
-
0.0803
82 
0.169
369 1               
INDEPEN
DENT 
-
0.0404
56 
-
0.121
977 
0.068
618 1             
INTERNA
TIONAL 
0.3161
41 
-
0.220
527 
-
0.154
751 
0.296701 1           
CEOBOAR
D 
0.3431
40 
-
0.036
946 
-
0.245
665 
-0.299861 -0.134048 1         
OWNERSH
IP 
-
0.1481
87 
0.050
332 
0.085
902 -0.321232 -0.207127 
-
0.05885
3 
1       
FIRMSIZE 
0.5718
68 
0.177
860 
0.030
441 0.139258 0.271313 
0.23564
6 
-
0.104784 1     
FIRMPERF 
-
0.0502
11 
-
0.101
657 
0.171
322 0.148473 0.054525 
-
0.09060
1 
-
0.188407 
-
0.0485
39 
1   
FIRMLEV 
0.0208
831 
-
0.138
005 
0.073
004 0.074783 0.079453 
0.24040
7 
-
0.088763 
0.1064
90 
0.2265
25 1 
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Appendix 7 – Development in compensation 
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